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AVENGERS OF BATAAN



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38TH ★ ★ INFANTRY DIVISION

Signature: *Richard P. [unclear]*
Date: _____

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by authority of AC of S, G-2, WDCB

by *Ray M. Stroup*
RAY M. STROUP
Capt., Inf

M-7 OPERATION



HISTORICAL REPORT

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9 AUG 1945

No PDR #

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REPORT ON THE

M-7
OPERATION

★ **38TH**

INFANTRY
DIVISION★

"THE AVENGERS OF BATAAN"



19 JANUARY 1945
to

30 JUNE 1945

UNCLASSIFIED

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HEADQUARTERS 38TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO 38

8 August 1945

HISTORICAL REPORT
M-7
OPERATION

38TH
INFANTRY
DIVISION

N-10739

"THE AVENGERS OF BATAAN"

19 JANUARY 1945
TO
30 JUNE 1945

E R R A T A S H E E T

The words "Peace Time T/O" are deleted from the last line of the third paragraph, page 7, and the following added in their place: "War Strength T/O".

The last sentence of the first paragraph, page 9, which reads "They arrived at Subic Bay on 11 February 1945", is deleted and the following added: "The 150th FA Bn (155mm How) arrived at Subic Bay on 3 February 1945 and was in position to support operations the following day. The remainder of these units arrived at Subic Bay on the afternoon of 10 February and debarked the following day".

The following paragraph is added to page 9:

"The Office of Division Quartermaster and Quartermaster Company (- 1 truck platoon, 1/2 service platoon and 1/2 ODQM which were with the rear echelon at New Guinea) operated initially under Corps control. On 1 February 1945, Corps released the Quartermaster Company headquarters and truck platoons to division control. The Quartermaster troops, with the rear echelon arrived at Subic Bay from New Guinea on 11 February 1945; the truck platoon going to division control and the remainder of the service platoon and ODQM going to Corps control. On 25 March 1945, Corps released the remainder of the Quartermaster troops to the division, thus making the Quartermaster Company intact again".

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In the first line of the last paragraph on page 1 the date "29 February 1945" is changed to read "29 January 1945". The second sentence of the same paragraph is changed to read "In five months ---" instead of "In four months ---".

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INTRODUCTION

This report describes the part played by the 38th Infantry Division in the M-7 operation on LUZON from 29 January - 30 June 1945.

All phases of the operation are covered. The hectic planning phase on LEYTE, the landing on the ZAMBALES Coast, the bitter opening battle in the ZIG ZAG PASS, the liberation of BATAAN and ZAMBALES PROVINCE, the capture of the MANILA BAY Forts, and the operations at FT STOTSENBURG and East of MANILA, are covered. All assigned missions were accomplished and over 20,000 Japanese were killed.

That stage of operations known as "mopping up" is often such only from the viewpoint of higher headquarters. From the viewpoint of this division and its regimental combat team, these actions on LUZON always became full scale attacks against well fortified and desperately defended positions. Of such were the operations of the 149th Infantry Regiment West of FT STOTSENBURG and the 152d Infantry Regiment on WOODPECKER RIDGE East of MARIKINA.

A narrative such as this must, of necessity, list only chronological events with supporting journals and files. These are of value to students of military history and to contemporary commanders for lessons learned from both mistakes and successes. Nothing appears concerning the great human factor, except to state that all ranks were imbued with the will to move in on the Jap and kill him.

Humble tribute is paid to the valor of the infantry soldier and abounding admiration and wonder for his fortitude, his patience and his indomitable spirit are keenly felt by all commanders of this division.

As a result of the operations in BATAAN in which the entire province was liberated, the 38th Infantry Division proudly adds to its division insignia the phrase -

THE AVENGERS OF BATAAN

W^m C. Chase.

WILLIAM C. CHASE
Major General, U.S. Army
Commanding

UNCLASSIFIED

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

GHQ



USAFFE

INITIALLY EIGHT ARMY-OPERATION
CAME UNDER CONTROL OF

SIXTH ARMY

ON LANDING AT SAN NARCISO

XI CORPS



38TH INFANTRY DIVISION



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 HEADQUARTERS 38TH INFANTRY DIVISION

APO 38

<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Commanding General	Maj Gen HENRY L. C. JONES Departed Hq Sixth Army 6 Feb 45	03168
Aide-de-Camp	Capt MILTON S. COOPER ADC to Div Comdr; departed Hq Sixth Army 6 Feb 45	0407479
Commanding General	Maj Gen WILLIAM C. CHASE Asgd & jd fr 1st Cav Div & assumed command 7 Feb 45 Aptd Maj Gen 20 Mar 45	04739
Aide-de-Camp	Capt HENRY M. FREIDENGER Asgd & jd fr Hq 1st Cav Div Luzon PI 11 Feb 45; departed TDY Comd & Gen Staff Sch, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 4 May 45	0450197
Aide-de-Camp	1st Lt BURNS T. TILTON Asgd & jd fr 1st Cav Div Luzon PI & Asgd ADC to Div Comdr 4 Mar 45	01031276
Asst Div Comdr	Brig Gen ROY W. EASLEY Assumed command 6 Feb 45; Reld Div Comdr & Asgd Asst Div Comdr 7 Feb 45; departed to Misc Group Hq USAFFE 2 Mar 45	0172501
Aide-de-Camp	1st Lt JAMES C. TAYLOR ADC to Asst Div Comdr; departed to Misc Group Hq USAFFE 3 Mar 45	01306660
Asst Div Comdr	Brig Gen ROBERT H. SOULE Asgd & jd fr 11th A/B Div & Asgd Asst Div Comdr 17 Mar 45; Aptd Brig Gen 12 Apr 45	011888
Aide-de-Camp	1st Lt NELSON N. LAMPERT Asgd & jd fr Co E 151st Inf for dy as ADC to Asst Div Comdr 20 Apr 45; detailed to ADC 27 Apr 45	01304081
Div Arty Comdr	Brig Gen WILLIAM SPENCE Asgd & jd fr 93d Inf Div & assumed command 8 Nov 44	04447

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Aide-de-Camp	1st Lt DENSLO B. GREEN Asgd & jd fr 93d Inf Div & Asgd ADC to Div Arty Comdr 8 Nov 44	0534264
Aide-de-Camp	1st Lt ROBERT A. TEWKSBURY Asgd 38th Div as ADC to Div Arty Comdr 8 June 44	0523414
Chief of Staff	Colonel A. J. HASTINGS	011721
G-1	Lt Col EARL V. DAVIS Evac to 36th Evac Hosp Luzon, PI 27 Feb 45	0391536
G-1	Lt Col GARRETT W. OLDS Detailed to GSC, Reld as AG Asgd G-1, 2 Mar 45	0179718
Asst	Maj JOHN L. VIOTTI Detailed to GSC 23 Mar 45 Promoted to Maj 16 Apr 45	01288145
Actg Asst (PCAU)	Maj ROY M. WHITE Civil Affairs Officer; Trfd to MP Command USAFFE 1 June 45	0320003
Actg Asst (PCAU)	1st Lt ANTHONY CANCELOSI Civil Affairs Officer	01303460
Asst	CWO DAVID S. MASON Promoted to CWO 22 Apr 45	W2109408
G-2	Lt Col OLLIE J. WILSON Evac to 60th Gen Hosp Luzon PI 10 May 45	0359154
G-2	Maj RICHARD F. JEFFERS	0327474
Asst	Maj THOMAS F. McNEAL Atchd and jd fr 152d Inf for dy as Sup-Evac Officer (Asst G-4) 18 Jan 45	0240050
Asst	Capt ROBERT D. OWENS (KIA Olongapo, Luzon, PI 5 Feb 45)	0350808

<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Actg Asst	Capt EUGENE RADER Atchd & jd fr 138th FA Bn for dy as Intelligence Staff O (Asst G-2) 17 May 45	0409987
Actg Asst	Capt WAYNE C. DUCKETT Asgd Actg Asst G-2 15 May 45	01283739
Asst (CIC)	1st Lt MURRAY SCHWARTZ Atchd fr USAFFE 20 Dec 44 for dy as Mil Int O (CIC)	01323976
Asst (PI Team)	1st Lt MORTON M. SCHNEIDER Aerial Photo Interpreter	01039997
Asst (OB Team)	1st Lt JAMES B. BROUSSARD Order of Battle Analyst; promoted to 1st Lt 2 Feb 45	01061636
Asst (ATIS)	1st Lt ROY F. LITTLE Interpreter (Mil Int O); Promoted to 1st Lt 25 Feb 45; Departed to 43d Inf Div 12 Apr 45	0558448
Asst (ATIS)	2d Lt LEONARD M. MENDELSON (Mil Int O); departed to 24th Inf Div 19 Jan 45	0558472
Asst (ATIS)	1st Lt YOSHIKAZU HIGASHI Interpreter (Mil Int O); promoted to 1st Lt 11 Apr 45	02037059
Asst (ATIS)	2d Lt WARREN R. JOHNSON Asgd & jd fr Hq 43d Inf Div for dy as Mil Int O, 15 Apr 45	0558440
G-3	Colonel ALEXANDER G. KIRBY Promoted to Col 14 Apr 45	0212867
Asst	Lt Col MENLO M. PURLEE Promoted to Lt Col 2 May 45	0372205
Asst (I & E O)	Capt ARNETT MCKENNAN Asgd to dy as I & E Officer 20 Feb 45	01175797
Liaison O	Capt DARWIN C. EBINGER	0452448
Liaison O	Capt WILLIAM M. TERRY	01304144

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ASSIGNMENT

NAME

ASN

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GLO	Capt FRED B. TUGGLE Atchd & jd fr Hq Sixth Army 23 Apr 45 for dy as Air Liaison Officer; Asgd Hq 38th Div 12 May 45	0398804
Liaison O	1st Lt UTHO T. BARNES Jd for TDY fr 149th Inf 24 May 45	01293524
Liaison O	1st Lt JOHN S O'CONNOR Jd for TDY fr 152d Inf 24 May 45	01306460
G-4	Lt Col FRED. C. DYER Reid Asgmt and Asgd Hq XIV Corps 8 June 45	0220739
G-4	Maj PHILLIP M. LORTON Trfd fr 38th Div Arty 8 June & assumed duties as AC of S, G-4	0411018
Asst	Maj EDWARD J. LICHTENSTEIN	01573365
Asst	WOJG JAMES B. MARSH Motor Transport Officer Evac to 36th Evac Hosp 27 Mar 45	W2109408
Adjutant General	Lt Col JOHN FISSELL Assumed duties as AG 2 Mar 45 Promoted to Lt Col 22 Mar 45	0408089
Asst	Maj CARL C. DUNHAM Promoted to Maj 22 Mar 45	0411002
Asst	WOJG HOWARD E. LIGHT Asst Adj Gen (Misc)	W2135036
Personnel	Capt HENRY W. TURNEY Asgd & jd fr 151st Inf for dy as Asst Adj Gen (Personnel Officer) 8 May 45. Detailed to AGD 30 May 45	0336547
Asst	CWO CECIL J. HILL	W2109402
Asst	WOJG WESLEY C. BERRY Aptd WOJG 23 Apr 45 & Asgd dy as Asst Adj Gen (Personnel) (formerly M/Sgt this Hq)	W2135295

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<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Classification	1st Lt JAMES J. SEYBOLD (Class & Asgmt 0); promoted to 1st Lt 1 Feb 45	01686323
Postal 0	Capt MARTIN PRIPSTEIN	01000649
Inspector General	Lt Col VIRGIL P. POWNALL Evac to 80th Gen Hosp Luzon PI 28 May 45	0147842
Asst	Capt WILBUR E. CHELLGREN Evac to 36th Evac Hosp 1 Mar 45	01285546
Asst	WOJG NORMAN ELDRIDGE	W2109410
Judge Advocate	Lt Col MAURICE D. BURTON Evac to 30th Gen Hosp Luzon PI 11 May 45	0277232
Judge Advocate	Lt Col ALLEN R. COZIER	0202208
Asst	1st Lt FRANCIS E. CASH Promoted to 1st Lt 6 Feb 45	02052020
Asst	WOJG RAYMOND E. KUSCHKE Aptd WOJG 23 Apr 45 & Asgd dy as Asst JAG (Adm Asst Legal) (former- ly S/Sgt this Hq)	W2135296
Finance 0	Lt Col JOE F. MINER	0281796
Asst	1st Lt HRANT AKMAKJIAN Promoted to 1st Lt 17 Apr 45	01281794
Asst	CWO FREDERIK B. JOHNSON Promoted to CWO 5 Apr 45	W2109409
Chemical 0	Lt Col HAROLD L. ANDERSON Departed to Rotation Det Base "K" Leyte PI 16 Apr 45	0301640
Chemical 0	Lt Col MARTIN T. OLSEN Asgd & jd fr Hq 43rd Inf Div for dy as Div Chem 0 13 Apr 45	0389016
Asst	Capt FRANK E. BOBO, Jr Promoted to Capt 16 Apr 45	0372186

[REDACTED]

<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>ASN</u>
Chaplain	Lt Col JAMES J. McMAHON	026443
Asst	Maj FREDERICK J. WESTENDORF	0336113
Actg Asst	Capt RICHARD F. DENBO	0419930
Div Surgeon	Lt Col FRANK B. RAMSEY	0278183
Asst	Capt ROBERT S. WHITING	01541960
Dental Surgeon	Maj JAMES F. FAVORITE	0333945
Neuropsychiatrist	Maj JULES V. COLEMAN	0486259
Div Med Insp	Maj ALVIN R. LAMB Evac to 36th Evac Hosp Castillejos Luzon PI 2 Feb 45	0119902
Div Med Insp	Maj HARVEY C. BLANTON Asgd & jd fr 113th Med Bn for dy as Div Med Insp 20 Mar 45	0369695
Asst	Capt HERBERT A. ANDERSON Asgd fr 259th Repl Co Leyte PI 14 Apr 45; jd 3 May 45 & Asgd Asst Div Med Insp	0473219
Special Service and PRO	Maj PEYTON HOGE	0408914
Actg Asst	Capt MILTON J. BUBLITZ Evac to 30th Gen Hosp 4 June 45	0331454
Actg Asst	Capt WILLIAM W. VAN PELT Correspondent (Atchd fr GHQ SWPA); departed to GHQ SWPA 1 Mar 45	01286928
Actg Asst	1st Lt MAURICE P. MURPHY Atchd & jd fr 151st Inf 18 Apr 45 for dy as Special Service O (Asst)	01306452

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PRIOR HISTORY

The 38th Infantry Division was reorganized after the First World War. The first elements were organized in 1920, and the Division as such Federally recognized 16 March 1923.

From then until January 1941, the whole Division (less 150th Infantry) trained together as a Division each summer training period.

On 17 January 1941 the 38th Infantry Division, then a square division composed of National Guard units from Indiana, Kentucky and West Virginia, was inducted into Federal Service at Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, Mississippi. In April and May 1941, the first Selectees were received, bringing the Division up to ~~Peace Time T/O.~~ *War Strength T/O.*

At Camp Shelby the Division underwent basic training and field maneuvers which ultimately led to active participation in the THIRD ARMY MANEUVERS in Louisiana in August-September 1941.

The Division furnished numerous personnel for newly activated Divisions, and large numbers of our best personnel for Officer Candidate Schools of all branches between October 1941 and the maneuvers in Louisiana in September-October-November 1942. These men were replaced from replacement training centers. Upon entering actual combat, only about 25% of original National Guard personnel remained.


Following the 1942 Louisiana Maneuvers and Amphibious Training at Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, intensive unit training and tests occurred at Camp Livingston, Louisiana. Fall of 1943 found the Division staging for overseas movement. Arriving in the Hawaiian Islands, beach defense of the Island of Oahu, further amphibious training, and jungle training occupied the next six months. The Division then moved to ORO BAY in NEW GUINEA where practical jungle training and unit training were carried on in preparation for final combat staging. In December 1944 the Division moved to LEYTE, participating in combat patrolling in the mopping up phase of that operation. The Division staged for the M-7 Operation at LEYTE.

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THE AVENGERS' BATTLEGROUND

LUZON, P. I.

ECIJA



LEGEND

- INITIAL LANDING - ZIG-ZAG
- - - BATAAN - ADJACENT ISLANDS
- - - STOTSENBURG AREA
- OPERATION EAST OF MANILA

CARABAO

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MISSION

On 19 January 1945 the 38th Infantry Division Reinf, was directed by FO #3, Hq XI Corps 19 January 1945, to participate in the M-7 Operation.

The mission of the operation was first to effect landings in Southern ZAMBALES Province, secure the airfield in the vicinity SAN MARCELINO and the naval base and its facilities on SUBIC BAY, to seize and occupy the general line DINALUPIHAN - HERMOSA, sealing off BATAAN from Northern LUZON and thus denying the enemy freedom of movement between the PAMPANGA Plains and BATAAN Peninsula. A subsequent mission to assure our complete control of BATAAN Peninsula was assigned on 30 January and consisted of an amphibious assault on the MARIVELES area coordinated with an amphibious and airborne attack on the Island of CORREGIDOR, a rapid movement South from HERMOSA, and the seizure of the BAGAC-PILAR Road. When the M-7 Operation was concluded, the 38th Infantry Division had destroyed all the Japanese forces in ZAMBALES and PAMPANGA Provinces, liberated BATAAN, and furnished a battalion and other units to the force that captured CORREGIDOR. During the "Mopping Up" phase, the 38th Infantry Division relieved the 43d Infantry Division in operation against the enemy forces between FT STOTSENBURG and MT PINATUBO. Following the completion of the FT STOTSENBURG operation the 38th Infantry Division relieved the 6th Infantry Division in the operation against the Japanese in the area East of MANILA. These were full scale actions. In accomplishing these missions the Division had various units attached from time to time.

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TROOP LIST

38th Inf Div
Hq 38th Inf Div
Hq Co, MP Plat 38th Inf Div
149th Inf Regt
151st Inf Regt (- Co E)
152d Inf Regt
Hq & Hq Btry 38th Inf Div Arty
138th FA Bn (105mm How)
139th FA Bn (105mm How)
163d FA Bn (105mm How)
11th FA Bn (155mm How)
113th Engr C Bn
113th Med Bn
38th Sig Co
738th Ord Co
64th Port Surg Hosp
592d JASCO (- Det)
603d Tk Co (- 1 Plat)
18th SAP (- Det)

The 150th FA Bn (155mm How), the 38th Rcn Tr, Co E 151st Inf, 38th Div Band and detachments of other units were enroute from ORO BAY, NEW GUINEA. They arrived at SUBIC BAY on 11 February 1945.

38th Div rear echelon arrived from LEYTE at SUBIC BAY 31 March 1945.

~~TOP SECRET~~

TERRAIN

The M-7 Operation was laid in the mountains of BATAAN, ZAMBALES and PAMPANGA Provinces (see sketch). Initially it was an attack that closely followed the course of the Japanese attack against the elements of the American Army which withdrew to BATAAN in December 1941.

The high ZAMBALES mountain range extends from the Southern tip of BATAAN to LINGAYEN Gulf. Except for small coastal plains, the terrain is mountainous with several peaks over five thousand feet in height. Heavy forest and steep walled valleys make movement over this range difficult for troops. The coastal area between SAN NARCISO and SAN ANTONIO is more extensive than usual with a depth of about ten miles.

Vegetation is generally heavy forest on the higher slopes. Bamboo thickets and dense underbrush on the lower slopes make movement and vision as difficult as in the jungle terrain found in NEW GUINEA, except on trails or roads. Vegetation on the coastal plain consists mainly of cultivated crops, with rice paddies predominating. At the time of the M-7 Operation the weather was dry and practically all rice paddies were hard and negotiable.

Main roads are Routes 7 and 110. Route 7 is an all-weather road which in the zone of our operations crosses the ZAMBALES Range from OLONGAPO to DINALUPIHAN in a tortuous track called the ZIG-ZAG Pass Road. Route 110 is an all-weather road from MARIVELES on the South to DINALUPIHAN, very rough South of ORION and reasonably good North therefrom.

From a study of the map of the area it is readily apparent that he who controls BATAAN controls MANILA Bay. There are many sites for air strips along the coastal plains while SUBIC Bay offers protected anchorages for ships and sea planes. Highway 7, the ZIG-ZAG Pass road, offers the only land movement for vehicles through the ZAMBALES range South of the LINGAYEN area. The extremely rugged terrain of BATAAN makes an ideal situation for a last stand defense.

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PLANNING AND MOVEMENT PHASE

The planning phase of the M-7 Operation began with the M-3 Operation on 25 December 1944 when the Division G-2, G-3, and G-4 were called to Headquarters Eighth Army to receive instructions. Immediately following this, Eighth Army issued Field Order #8 setting up the units involved, the shipping available, the estimated capacity in vehicles, personnel, tonnage and the dates of resupply convoys. The smaller units involved were scattered from BRISBANE to LEYTE, and of those on LEYTE, many were dispersed from CARRIGARA to AMBUYOG with no telegraph or telephone communications. Teams of officers were sent out to locate and inform them of their projected participation and to acquire the necessary logistics. It was soon found that published TO & Es were useless as reference documents, first because some special groups had none, and second because many units were authorized special equipment in excess of T/E.

In assigning the shipping where several units moved on the same vessel, it was necessary to direct how many and what type of vehicles would be taken. With the exception of the Engineer Group who were assigned a group of shipping estimated to carry their special equipment, this was done. In arriving at the allotment, essential service units received especial attention and the least reduction in vehicles.

This vehicle allotment made to combat units is not recommended for future operations. In the M-3 Operation the area to be occupied initially was very small and motor transportation from D-day to D/10 was not a major item. This received consideration in arriving at the number of vehicles to be taken, the final allotment being based on the bringing forward of additional vehicles on D/5 and D/10. The D/5 and D/10 ships were taken away later, resulting in the M-7 Operation being carried out with what proved to be too few vehicles for the extended area covered.

On 19 January, when the planning had reached the stage of assembling the TQMs, S-3s, and representatives of the 592d EB & S Regt to discuss detailed loading and unloading, the M-3 Operation was cancelled and the M-7 began. Due to lack of definite knowledge of the operation several days were lost in the planning phase. When definite information became available loading plans continued, being varied from time to time as variations occurred in number and types of ships to be furnished, and as the usual last minute accommodations for observers and specialists were made.

Since the time was short and the XI Corps staff was unac-

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quainted with the details of what had been done, it was wisely decided that the 38th Infantry Division continue with the loading and embarkation, including many units now assigned as Corps troops. Loading and embarkation of the 34th RCT was placed under the direction of XI Corps and is not covered in this report.


Variations between the printed characteristics of the ships and the actual characteristics, plus the decisions of the ships' captains, called for changes in the plans after the arrival of the Navy TQMs, and in some cases after the supplies were moving from the beaches to the transports. This was particularly true of ammunition.

Difficulty in loading and embarkation was occasioned by the great distances, in some cases up to 45 miles, between units and the loading points and the poor communications between them. The use of the telephone varied inversely with the daily rainfall and the distance involved, frequently failing altogether. Much assistance was given by the Transportation Section, XI Corps.

At sailing time, all units and all vehicles originally allotted, plus a few additional where the space permitted, were aboard.

The trip to LUZON was without incident, the weather being clement, and with no enemy action. The debarkation area was reached in the early morning of 29 January. During the trip a message was received that the Japanese had withdrawn from the SAN ANTONIO, SAN NARCISO, SAN MARCELINO area, and it was decided to withhold the preliminary naval bombardment.

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COMBAT PHASE

The M-7 Operation covered a very extensive area including the major portions of the ZAMBALES, BATAAN, and PAMPANGA Provinces of LUZON, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. (See sketch).

In order to simplify and place into an understandable sequence the combat phase of the M-7 Operation will be divided into four parts:

INITIAL LANDING - ZIG-ZAG	(29 Jan to 14 Feb 1945)
BATAAN - ADJACENT ISLANDS	(11 Feb to 17 Apr 1945)
STOTSENBURG AREA	(7 Mar to 30 Apr 1945)
EAST OF MANILA	(30 Apr to 30 June 1945)

Each of these may further be divided into what appears to be separate actions, although the continuity will be retained insofar as clearness will permit.

The INITIAL LANDING - ZIG-ZAG action may be considered one continuous operation. American forces successfully landed, secured air strip facilities vicinity of SAN MARCELINO, and meeting no opposition, rapidly advanced into the SUBIC BAY - OLONGAPO area securing the port facilities thereof. There in the ZIG-ZAG Pass area, extending from SANTA RITA East to DINALUPIHAN, the Japanese forces made an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the accomplishment of the original mission. In the meantime, and as ZIG-ZAG developed, the GRANDE ISLAND at the entrance to SUBIC Bay was secured by an amphibious landing.

Closely following and even before the ZIG-ZAG action terminated, the BATAAN - ADJACENT ISLANDS Operation began. Concurrently, the occupation of the PILAR - BAGAC Road, the East coast road (Highway 110) and the successful amphibious landing at MARIVELES were made. Assistance to the 503d Parachute Infantry in its capture of CORREGIDOR was also given. Amphibious assaults of CABALLO Island, EL FRAILE Island (Fort Drum), and CARABAO Island, all in the entrance to MANILA BAY, followed the collapse of Japanese resistance on CORREGIDOR.

The third or STOTSENBURG Area portion of the M-7 Operation centers around the mountainous area between FT STOTSENBURG and MT PINATUBO, the highest mountain in the CABUSILAN Mountain Range. In this operation our forces, other than those engaged at STOTSENBURG, also pushed North from SAN FELIPE to PALAUIG BAY and East from BOTOLAN along the CAPAS Trail into the O'DONNELL - MORIONES area. This cut off the enemy's escape routes North into the LINGAYEN sector.

The fourth part of the M-7 Operation was the destruction


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of the enemy forces EAST OF MANILA. This operation drove the Japanese East of the MARIQUINA River - BOSO BOSO River line, and destroyed or dispersed all effective units in that area.

Classification of these operations may fall between the combat phase and the mopping up phase as they were not the initial operations in those areas. Participation by our forces began upon relief of the Divisions then in contact, but unlike other engagements in the mopping up phase, they developed into major operations against stiff organized enemy resistance.

The "Mopping Up" Phase began at different times for different units of the Division, and some regiments became engaged in an active operation afterward. Hence this must be discussed in piecemeal, rather than as a separate Phase.

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INITIAL LANDING ZIG-ZAG

At 290830 January the first waves hit Red and Yellow Beach. Prior reconnaissance by Navy and Division staff officers in a patrol boat at 0630 had shown that the beaches were crowded with cheering FILIPINOS, the American flag proudly flying in their midst. Their enthusiastic greeting actually delayed the initial progress, but their willing help was of great assistance in getting vehicles and supplies ashore.


Due to the narrowness of the beach the 38th Division landed regiments abreast, battalions in column, with the 152d Infantry on the right, the 149th Infantry in the center, and the 151st Infantry on the left. The 151st Infantry in addition landed one battalion on Yellow Beach to protect left flank.

The regiments immediately moved rapidly inland, meeting no opposition. The 149th Infantry seized the SAN MARCELINO Airstrip by 1600. The 152d Infantry secured their sector of the Corps beachhead by 1400. The 1st Battalion 151st Infantry reached SAN FELIPE and set up a defensive line North of that town by 1330. During the same period the 3d Battalion 151st Infantry (-) moved South to SAN ANTONIO to secure Blue Beach and cover the right flank of the Corps beachhead. This was completed at 1800 without confusion or interruption to traffic. The 151st Infantry was then placed in Corps reserve.


The following day, 30 January, the 149th Infantry and 152d Infantry moved to the pass South of CASTILLEJOS. This same day the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry made a shore-to-shore operation, landing on GRANDE Island in SUBIC Bay without opposition.

The mission initially assigned the 34th RCT by XI Corps was to advance rapidly via SAN MARCELINO, CASTILLEJOS, and SUBIC and seize OLONGAPO. This was accomplished against minor resistance. On 31 January the 152d Infantry was ordered to relieve the 34th RCT astride Highway 7 North of Olongapo, and the 34th RCT ordered back to the OLONGAPO-SUBIC area.

On 31 January the mission assigned the 38th Division was to clear Highway 7, the OLONGAPO-DINALUPIHAN road, and establish contact with elements of XIV Corps in the vicinity of DINALUPIHAN. To accomplish this, the Division was directed to advance one regiment astride Highway 7 and one regiment East by a parallel trail North of Highway 7 to DINALUPIHAN. The latter regiment was to turn West and strike the ZIG-ZAG area from the rear via Highway 7. The 152d Infantry was designated to advance East on Highway 7, relieving the 34th RCT, and the 149th Infantry (less 1st Battalion in Division Reserve) to take the North trail, the Western end of which was SANTA RITA.




OLONGAPO - DINALUPIHAN
ZIG-ZAG PASS **SCALE 1:180,000 APPROX**



OLONGAPO - DINALUPIHAN

▨ AREA COVERED BY AIR STRIKES IN ZIG ZAG PASS
 MUNITIONS EXPENDED: 193,050 GALS NAPALM, 243 TONS BOMBS, 1,728,000 RDS CAL.50




- TUNNEL OR CAVES
- ◆ PILLBOXES
- ≡ TRENCHES
- FOXHOLES

ENEMY DEFENSES
ZIG ZAG PASS
SCALE 1:10,000 SHEET # 1

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


ENEMY DEFENSES
ZIG ZAG PASS
SCALE 1:10,000 SHEET # 2

96

03

04



ENEMY DEFENSES ZIG ZAG PASS

SCALE 1:10,000 SHEET # 3

SANTA RITA RIVER

HWY 7

TANKS DESTROYED
BY ARTY
091535

120MM


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**ENEMY DEFENSES
ZIG ZAG PASS**

SCALE 1:10,000

SHEET #4

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In the SAN NARCISO-SAN FELIPE area the 151st Infantry continued extensive patrolling as Corps reserve.

Relief of the 34th RCT, less 63d FA Bn attached to the 38th Division Artillery, was started by the 152d Infantry while the 149th Infantry, less 1st Battalion in Division reserve, closed in vicinity SANTA RITA. By 311800 January the 149th Infantry was prepared to move East via an uncharted trail North of Highway 7.

On 1 February the 152d Infantry completed relief of the 34th RCT, some elements of the 34th Infantry not moving until the following day. During this relief elements of both regiments became involved in actions against enemy strong points. Heavy fire from prepared enemy positions was by-passed by the leading 1st Battalion as the 152d Infantry proceeded East on Highway 7 toward ZIG-ZAG Pass on 1 February. These positions were subsequently reduced by the 2d Battalion that followed. By 1200 the regiment had advanced three and one half miles inland, neutralizing all enemy positions up to that point. Each yard gained was marked by increased resistance.

Meanwhile the 2d Battalion 149th Infantry with Co C 113th Medical Battalion, 1 Platoon Co A 113th Engineer Battalion, and 64th Portable Surgical Hospital, started East to DINALUPIHAN over a trail reported North of Highway 7, known as the SANTA RITA Trail. This trail, beginning at SANTA RITA on the West and emerging at BETA on the East, was a Negrito trail used by the Guerrillas during the period of enemy occupation. The route, reported as paralleling Highway 7 at about 1500 to 2000 yards, proved to be in error. It developed that this trail was actually 8000 to 10,000 yards North of the Highway. It crossed a series of extremely difficult and heavily wooded ridges and ravines, much of it overgrown. Difficulties were added to the march in that all equipment was hand carried, including a complete Portable Surgical Hospital, and water on the higher ridges was very scarce. To supply these columns it was necessary to provide daily air drop service along the route of march. This mountain march over trails known only to the native guides covered a period of five days.

A discussion of the terrain and the enemy's plan of defense of the ZIG-ZAG Pass will make clear the account that follows.

From CLONGAPO, Highway 7 was constructed on flat land about 2 miles, abruptly entering a narrow mountain valley. In the next 5 miles the road reaches an elevation of approximately 800 feet by a series of loops and hairpin curves around and between hills which completely dominate the Highway. It was around the sides and on the tops of these hills that the Japan-

[REDACTED]

ese entrenchments were placed, the defenses on each hill interlocking with the fires from adjacent hills. This defense was well planned in depth as is indicated on the accompanying sketch.


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A curious fact is that little or no attempt was made to defend or place harassing fire on the flat ground leading from OLONGAPO, although the first entrenched hills afforded an excellent opportunity. They had, however, previously destroyed their reconstructed port installations and some civilian residences.

Continuing for the next 8 miles the first hills encountered upon leaving OLONGAPO were intricately entrenched. Sited in the rear of the strongest defenses were excellently emplaced and camouflaged 10cm and 75mm artillery and 120mm mortars, with ranges to key points predetermined and evidently registered on, prior to our attack. Maps captured later indicated these places, in which our forces experienced heavy mortar and artillery fire. These mortars and artillery pieces were scattered across the zone, and although this gave excellent defensive dispersion, it also made the massing of fires impossible. 47mm AT guns were interspersed between the artillery pieces, effectively covering the few available routes of tank approach.

The second element characterizing the defense was the lack of width of the defended zone. To the North there was a large hill mass, the Northern slope being the South bank of the SANTA RITA River. This bank was a vertical cliff varying from 40 to 100 feet in height and rising from a rough, narrow stream bed. The Japanese had overlooked the possibility of troops moving between the cliff and their Northern positions. Our units were able to flank these enemy positions consistently from the North, although even a flanking attack was a frontal one because of the all-around defense employed on each hill. To the South the ground fell off into a saddle between the road and FAMILIAR PEAK, which was covered with heavy jungle and considered impassable. The enemy mission was to block the use of Highway 7 which could be effectively accomplished from their positions astride the road.

The third, and most difficult element of the whole defense was the system of well dug-in positions. Each hill top was crowned with a series of foxholes, each about 5 to 6 feet deep and with tunnels of 4 to 8 feet extending from the bottom of the foxhole. Many of these foxholes were then partially covered with logs and earth, leaving one hole facing to the front and another to the rear. Each foxhole was connected to the next by a shallow communicating trench. Carefully planned and sited MG positions, pillboxes, and dugouts were interspersed throughout the area. A direct hit by artillery



ZIG ZAG PASS

SITUATION 1 FEB - 5 FEB

SCALE 1:10,000

SHEET #1

MOVEMENTS OF UNITS NOT SHOWN WHEN ON HWY 7

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[REDACTED]

or mortars, or attack by the individual riflemen were the only means of silencing the fire of each foxhole or emplacement. In the area were spider-holes, command post caves, and caves containing ample food and ammunition. Thus each hill top was a fortress which had to be reduced in turn. Behind these hill tops were stores of rations and supplies. Effective concealment for all these installations was given by the maze of trees, underbrush, and bamboo thickets with which the whole area of the pass is liberally covered.

During the morning of 2 February the 152d Infantry mopped up scattered groups that were bypassed the previous day. When the entire area up to the leading elements of the 1st Battalion was cleared the Regiment advanced abreast the Highway, 2d Battalion on the right, 3d Battalion on the left, 1st Battalion in reserve. Having advanced to a point on the Highway (02.6-96.9) offensive action was hindered by the extremely steep slopes rising on the North of the Highway giving the enemy great strength in the defense of the pass. His prepared positions on commanding ground delivered extremely accurate mortar and machine gun fire that withstood our attack till late in the period when the Regiment dug in for the night. All Battalions suffered severe mortar and artillery fire during the night and were subjected to continued attempts at infiltration.

On 2 February the 2d and 3d Battalions 149th Infantry closed in bivouac approximately 8000 yards North of Highway 7. The exact location is still a controversial question. As the result of two messages, one undelivered due to failure of radios, and one garbled in transmission, instructions were issued for the return of the Regiment to SANTA RITA. The 2d Battalion, Company A 113th Medical Battalion and 1 Platoon Company A 113th Engineer Battalion returned to SANTA RITA arriving at 1930, 2 February. That night instructions were given to proceed again to DINALUPIHAN, and releasing the 1st Battalion 149th Infantry from Division Reserve.

During the night of 2-3 February orders were received directing the 34th RCT under XI Corps control to relieve the 152d Infantry in place, pass through the 152d Infantry and continue the attack, clearing the road to DINALUPIHAN. The 152d Infantry was to follow the 34th RCT, when bypassed, mopping up any enemy resistance left behind, and maintaining the lines of communication.

On 3 February the 34th Infantry began to pass through the 152d Infantry, but when the leading battalion advanced beyond the line of the 152d Infantry, it encountered such heavy resistance that it could not advance. This caused both units to be jammed in the area along Highway 7, causing heavy casualties from enemy mortar and artillery fire. The 152d

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Terrain North of Highway 7 up which 152d attacked on 2-3 February 1945. Destroyed Pill-box in center.



Visibility Zero

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Infantry sent patrols to the North of the Highway, to determine the enemy's right (North) flank.

The 1st and 2d Battalions and Regimental Headquarters 149th Infantry with Company A 113th Medical Battalion, one Platoon Company A 113th Engineer (C) Battalion left SANTA RITA, reaching the bivouac of the 3d Battalion that evening.


The 152d Infantry on 4 February mopped up close-in enemy positions and sent the 1st Battalion West down the Highway, then North, and East against the enemy's right flank. During the move East several Japanese positions were encountered by the 1st Battalion and taken. Late in the afternoon, a large enemy position was encountered and engaged. At about 1630 intense enemy fire caused the loss of all the officers, except one, in two rifle companies, and one half the NCOs in the three rifle companies. The Battalion moved down to the road to reorganize.

The 34th Infantry attempted to advance down the Highway with units on both sides of the road but was stopped by the hostile resistance. The tanks supporting the 34th Infantry tried to break through down the road, but when the Infantry were left behind, the Japanese attacked them with lunge mines, so the tanks withdrew. A Company was sent to the right (South) flank to locate the flank of the enemy's position, but became lost in the FAMILIAR PEAK area, and was reported cut off and surrounded. At 2050 4 February the 34th Infantry was attached to the 38th Infantry Division.

The 149th Infantry continued its march East in two columns, toward DINALUPIHAN. The 3d Battalion halted for the night 1500 yards Northwest of BETA. The balance of the Regiment halted behind the 3d Battalion on the trail.

On 5 February the 34th Infantry was assigned the mission of advancing on the South side of the Highway, with the 152d Infantry on the North. Elements of the 34th Infantry were in advance of the 152d Infantry, and in attempting to maneuver around their opposition, moved North of the road. This caused such confusion that instructions were issued that no artillery concentrations would be fired West of the SANTA RITA River without permission of the Regimental Commanding Officer of the sector concerned. This inevitably caused a delay in the placing of close-in artillery fires. The 34th Infantry, unable to advance, and suffering heavy casualties, requested to be withdrawn, and the 151st Infantry was ordered to relieve them on 6 February.

This same day, 5 February, the 149th Infantry completed its march to DINALUPIHAN, established contact with elements of XIV Corps and set up a road block at LAYAC. The 2d Battalion



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152d Infantry moved South of the Highway and occupied commanding ground 800 yards North of FAMILIAR PEAK. Contact was made with A Company 34th Infantry, guides were furnished them and A Company returned to the Highway at the Horseshoe Bend. The 1st Battalion 152d Infantry continued its drive East along the ridge North of Highway 7 reducing enemy emplacements. Late in the period strong enemy underground works were encountered and the Battalion went into a perimeter for the night.

On 6 February the 34th Infantry was detached from the 38th Infantry Division and moved to the rear, the 151st Infantry taking over their sector. Air strikes and heavy artillery preparations were placed on the Japanese ZIG-ZAG defenses in preparation for a coordinated attack to the East by the 151st Infantry and the 152d Infantry. The 2d Battalion 152d Infantry was moved back into Division Reserve North and West of the Horseshoe Bend with the mission of protecting the left rear of the 152d Infantry. The 149th Infantry prepared for their advance to the West against ZIG-ZAG, and relieved elements of the XIV Corps in the DINALUPIHAN area. To the North of Highway 7 the 152d Infantry continued to advance slowly against a number of prepared positions and under heavy machine gun and mortar fire. The advance in all sectors was assisted by the accurate supporting fire of the Division Artillery, and coordinated air strikes. As of this date the Division had advanced from OLONGAPO inland a distance of approximately 9000 yards.

On 6 February Maj Gen H. L. C. Jones was relieved from command of the 38th Infantry Division.

On 7 February Maj Gen William C. Chase (then Brig Gen) took command of the 38th Infantry Division.

On 7 February 1945 the 149th Infantry advanced West against sniper fire until 1500 when they encountered an organized enemy position 800 yards East of BALSIC. Company A bypassed it. By 1800 the battalion had overcome all opposition. A second position was encountered 400 yards East of BALSIC and the 1st Battalion halted for the night.

The 2d Battalion 152d Infantry was committed from Division Reserve and continued the advance to the East on the North of the Highway, assaulted and secured enemy strong point (03.0-97.2) after a brisk fight. The mission of the 1st Battalion was to follow the 2d Battalion and secure 2d Battalion's left flank. The 3d Battalion continued methodically to assault and mop up the enemy positions in their front against strong opposition on their North.

The 3d Battalion 151st Infantry was ordered to proceed to

[REDACTED]

FAMILIAR PEAK. On arrival they sent patrols to the SANTA RITA River bridge and to the East along the South side of Highway 7 in an effort to contact the 149th Infantry. No contact was made with the enemy or 149th Infantry and the battalion went into perimeter 400 yards South of SANTA RITA River bridge.

On 8 February Company G 149th Infantry attached to the 1st Battalion 149th Infantry attacked and destroyed the enemy position encountered at the close of the previous period. The 1st Battalion less Company B reverted to Regimental reserve. The 2d Battalion attacked through the 1st Battalion and advanced 400 yards West of BALSIC where they encountered enemy machine gun and mortar fire. Artillery was placed on this Japanese position following which the Battalion overran it. After a further advance of 300 yards another strong position was encountered, reduced and occupied. In the early evening two Japanese tanks attacked the perimeter from across the creek. Rifle grenades and bazookas proved ineffective, so artillery fire was called for and the tanks withdrew. At 1830 the 3d Battalion 151st Infantry advancing East on the South side of the road was attached to 149th Infantry.

The 151st Infantry (less 3d Battalion) was ordered to pass through and relieve the 152d Infantry. Relief of the 152d Infantry was slowed up by enemy mortar concentrations, which were silenced by artillery and the relief continued. At 1300 the 1st Battalion 151st Infantry and 2d Battalion 151st Infantry (less Company E which had not arrived on LUZON from ORO BAY) were in position, and supported by tanks, moving forward, the 2d Battalion against a strong point at (03.2-96.8). After limited gains the Battalions at 1800 went into perimeters for the night, the 1st Battalion at (03.1-97.2), the 2d Battalion at (02.8-96.9), and the 3d Battalion at (04.8-95.8).

After relief by the 151st Infantry the 1st Battalion 152d Infantry advanced East in a zone North of the 1st Battalion 151st Infantry. It reduced numerous enemy strong points in the advance from the vicinity of (02.8-97.5) to the vicinity of (03.3-97.6). The 2d Battalion 152d Infantry reorganized in the position it was holding in Division Reserve. The 3d Battalion was engaged in mopping up operations.

On 9 February, while the 1st Battalion 149th Infantry was in Regimental Reserve protecting the rear and flanks of the Regiment, the 2d Battalion 149th Infantry attacked through heavy undergrowth against enemy automatic fire. Three tanks, protected by machine guns and snipers were encountered during the day. Rockets and grenades could not immobilize the tanks, however the machine guns on one were put out of action by two direct bazooka hits. At 1532 an artillery plane located 2

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


Japanese tank destroyed by 149th Infantry
in their drive West through ZIG-ZAG Pass



An aerial view of ZIG-ZAG Pass at it's Eastern exit near BALSIC. In the lower right hand corner an enemy tank blazes from a direct hit by our artillery. In the center of the picture the artillery scores another direct hit on an ammunition dump just off the road.

SECRET



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tanks and artillery fire was placed on them resulting in one direct hit at 9000 yards. The 3d Battalion continued extensive patrolling with nil contact in the vicinity of ORANI. Control of 3d Battalion 151st Infantry reverted back to 151st Infantry, as effective control could not be exercised by the 149th Infantry due to tank activity in between.

The 151st Infantry, on 9 February, was ordered to continue the attack. The 2d Battalion made slow progress but developed a net work of machine gun emplacements. Tanks were brought up to assist in the reduction of these positions. One tank exhausted its ammunition supply and one tank was knocked out. The 2d Battalion 151st Infantry was short Company E and two platoons of Company G. To assist them, Companies F and G of the 152d Infantry were attached to the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry. During the middle of the day, the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry encountered heavy resistance. Hard fighting at close ranges ensued, lasting till dark, when the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry moved into a perimeter on an adjacent hill occupied the previous night. The 2d Battalion 152d Infantry as Division Reserve was committed between the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 151st Infantry, (Company F 152d Infantry reverting to Battalion control) through this gap they continued the attack against stubborn resistance reaching and holding their objective. The 152d Infantry (less 2d Battalion) during the period had reduced and mopped up strong points at (03.1-96.5) and (03.5-97.5), against strong resistance.

On 9 February the 3d Battalion 151st Infantry attempted to contact the 149th Infantry South of Highway 7. The action of the 149th Infantry with the Japanese tanks, and the artillery concentrations in between the two units prevented contact.

On 10 February the 149th Infantry 1st Battalion, launched an attack from the vicinity of point (06.9-96.1) on the South of the Highway, Company C in the lead. They advanced 800 yards where contact was made with the tanks again. The 2d Battalion, in a deployed formation on the North side of the road, advanced slowly, here also a tank was encountered and fired on without effect. The tank withdrew to a concealed position. At 1700 the Battalion moved into the perimeter of the previous night. The 151st Infantry organized Companies F and G together with Company G, 152d Infantry, into an assault detachment to reduce an elaborate system of tunnels holding up the advance. After two assaults it was reduced and 25 Japanese killed. The entire day was spent reducing like installations, all mutually supporting and well manned. The 152d Infantry continued the attack to the East against stubborn resistance, the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry (less Company G) reaching and holding ground


ZIG ZAG PASS

SITUATION 9 FEB - 14 FEB

SCALE 1:10,000

SHEET # 4

MOVEMENTS OF UNITS NOT SHOWN WHEN ON HWY 7



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One of the World's largest field mortars (120mm) captured intact by infantrymen of the 152d Infantry during the battle of ZIG-ZAG Pass. Three others were destroyed.

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~~SECRET~~

SECRET



Hill (03.0-96.8) just South of Highway 7 that withstood attack for six days until taken by 2d Bn 151st Infantry and 2d Bn 152d Infantry.



Terrain confronting 149th Infantry West of Balsic where engagements with Japanese tanks occurred.

- 26 -

SECRET

[REDACTED]

in the vicinity of (03.3-96.7). The 3d Battalion 152d Infantry, relieved by 2d Battalion 151st Infantry, moved to (01.8-96.8) and remained there, replacing 2d Battalion 152d Infantry as Division reserve. The 1st Battalion 152d Infantry operated on the left (North) flank and reduced heavily armed, well entrenched positions on Hill (03.7-97.7).

During the preceding action, elements of the 152d Infantry had been committed to assist the 151st Infantry. Elements of the 151st Infantry, engaged North of the Highway, had to be assisted by the 152d Infantry. They could not be disengaged. To simplify control, all units North of Highway 7 were placed under command of Lt Col McIntosh, 152d Infantry, and all units South of Highway 7 under command of Col Ralf Paddock, 151st Infantry.


On 10 February the 3d Battalion 151st Infantry was ordered to return to the Regiment and moved to the vicinity of the Horse Shoe Bend.

On 11 February the 3d Battalion 151st Infantry relieved the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry and Companies F and G 152d Infantry were detached from the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry and reverted to 2d Battalion 152d Infantry. 2d Battalion 151st Infantry was put in Regimental reserve; they continued mopping up operations in the vicinity of (03.3-96.7). The forces moving East through the ZIG-ZAG Pass were in order from North to South as follows: 1st Battalion 152d Infantry on the left flank, 3d Battalion 152d Infantry to the rear of and on the left flank of 1st Battalion 151st Infantry who had its right flank on Highway 7. The 2d Battalion 152d Infantry on the South of the Highway with its left flank on the Highway. 3d Battalion 151st Infantry on the right flank. The 2d Battalion 151st Infantry in Regimental reserve mopped up around its position.

The 2d Battalion 152d Infantry advanced to the enemy position at (03.3-96.7), which was reduced after a sharp fight and occupied for the night. The 3d Battalion 152d Infantry met moderate resistance and advanced to (03.6-97.4). The 151st Infantry was receiving heavy fire from (03.5-97.2) which checked the entire advance. To prepare for another mission the 151st Infantry was relieved by 152d Infantry and ordered to an assembly area near OLONGAPO. The entire regiment had closed in their rear area at 1800. 1st Battalion 149th Infantry attacked on the South side Highway 7 following an air strike. In their drive Westward aggressive action disclosed strongly entrenched positions (06.3-96.2) which were reduced and occupied after hard fighting. The 2d Battalion 149th Infantry after an advance of 300 yards, encountered an enemy tank. 81mm mortar fire placed

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- 27 -

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on the tank forced it to withdraw. The Battalion at the end of the day dug in (06.4-96.9).

On 12 February the 149th Infantry was continuing their attack to the West. The 1st Battalion on the South side of the road encountered Japanese positions that withstood artillery and mortar fire. Attacking with BAR's, grenades, and rifles the positions were taken and its 60 Japanese defenders killed at a cost of 1 casualty to the Battalion. During the day the Battalion advanced several hundred yards. The 2d Battalion attacked to the North from positions on the right of Highway 7. Near the close of the day a strongly fortified position was located 400 yards North of the Highway in dense undergrowth. The approaches to this position were well covered by enemy machine gun fire. To combat this situation the Battalion withdrew and called for artillery fire on the position during the night.

The 152d Infantry assaulted the position that had checked the advance the previous day. Strong points (03.5-96.9) which included mortar and artillery positions were assaulted and destroyed after fierce fighting by the 1st Battalion. The 2d and 3d Battalions advanced against strong opposition, and seized and held their objective North and South of point (03.8-96.65). Vast quantities of enemy ammunition and supplies were captured during the day.

On 13 February a patrol from Company A 149th Infantry contacted a patrol from the 152d Infantry at point (02.5-96.15). The day was spent reducing minor strong points and the 1st Battalion 149th Infantry remained in the perimeter of the preceding night. The 2d Battalion 149th Infantry attacked the strong point on the North side of the highway that had checked their advance at the close of preceding day. Following an artillery preparation it was reduced and occupied against heavy fire. The attack continued to the Northwest, and an advance of 200 yards was made. The 149th Infantry was now within 800 yards of the 152d Infantry.

The advance of the 152d Infantry continued against sniper and machine gun resistance. The 3d Battalion gained and held its objective North of the Highway at the (05) grid line. The 2d Battalion reduced and occupied enemy positions on high ground (05.5-96.25).

On 14 February the 149th Infantry 1st Battalion advanced on the South side of Highway 7 where minor enemy positions were encountered and eliminated. Contact was made with the 152d Infantry at (05.2-96.6) and Highway 7 was open to traffic at 1330. The 2d Battalion 149th Infantry attacked from the East


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and Northeast. Grenades and close combat fighting overcame all resistance encountered. By 1600 all organized resistance had been eliminated and junction was made with 1st Battalion 152d Infantry attacking from the West.

On 15 February the 149th and 152d Infantry started mopping up the scattered enemy resistance remaining in the ZIG-ZAG Pass. On 16 February the 149th Infantry was ordered to move East to DINALUPIHAN to participate in operations on the East coast of BATAAN. The 152d Infantry was given the mission of securing Highway 7 from OLONGAPO to DINALUPIHAN and to continue mopping up operations in the ZIG-ZAG Pass.

At the close of the ZIG-ZAG fight the Division had killed 1846 Japanese and taken 18 prisoners.

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CORREGIDOR · CABALLO · EL FRAILE · CARABAO

SCALE 1:180,000 APPROX

UNCLASSIFIED

BATAAN - ADJACENT ISLANDS

Field Order 6, Headquarters XI Corps, dated 17 February 1945 gave the 38th Infantry Division Reinforce the additional mission of securing the PILAR - BAGAC Road and the destruction of all enemy forces on the BATAAN Peninsula. Enemy forces were estimated to number 4000 - 8000 on BATAAN with 3000 of these on the PILAR - BAGAC Road. This later proved to be much too high.

XI Corps directed that two separate forces carry out this mission. The SOUTH FORCE composed of the 151st Infantry Reinforce was to land at MARIVELES, secure a beachhead and the air strip immediately to the North, and advance North on Highway 110 to make a junction with the EAST FORCE advancing South. The EAST FORCE was to consist of the 149th Infantry. Due to their engagement in the ZIG-ZAG, the 1st Infantry RCT from XIV Corps was substituted. The mission of this force was to move South along Highway 110 from DINALUPIHAN, to establish contact with the SOUTH FORCE, and to secure Highway 111, the PILAR - BAGAC Road.

Constructed through the mountainous foothills formed by MT NATIB on the North and MT MARIVELES on the South, the PILAR-BAGAC Road consists of curves and hairpin turns similar to those in the ZIG-ZAG PASS. Densely wooded high cliffs and deep gorges afforded excellent defensive installations. But, to the disadvantage of the Japanese forces, they had constructed interlocking and deeply entrenched defensive positions intended to repel attacking forces advancing from BAGAC on the West coast. It was evident that the enemy had hastily occupied and improved positions from which our own American forces had so successfully repelled the Japanese occupation of BATAAN in 1942.

Ample support was available from the 5th Air Force. Day after day Highway 111 from PILAR to BAGAC and the coast North and South of BAGAC was subjected to 500 and 1000 pound demolition bombs, fragmentation bombs, Napalm bombs, and strafing. As the ground forces pushed from the East coast numerous heavy air strikes were placed in advance of the leading elements. Continuous air observation by the Air Force and by our own Artillery liaison planes located enemy activities and installations North and South of the road as they hastily attempted to shift their defenses to repel an easterly attack. These offered excellent air targets and were consequently pounded day after day.

Much credit is due to 5th Air Force in this portion of

[REDACTED]

the M-7 Operation. As complete clearance of the PILAR - BAGAC Road developed, it was quite evident that air strikes had completely demoralized the enemy and prohibited an effective defense. This enabled the ground forces to rapidly advance with only scattered opposition.

On 14 February a detachment of the 38th Division Headquarters flown by Artillery liaison planes from OLONGAPO and commanded by Brig Gen William Spence, was joined at ORANI by the 1st Infantry Regiment reinforced by the 1st Field Artillery Battalion, Company C 754th Tank Battalion, Company C 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company A 6th Engineer (C) Battalion.

From 14 to 17 February the southward advance to PILAR by the EAST FORCE was unopposed, except for a brisk action at ORION.

On night of 14-15 February a large group of Japanese attacked the CP of the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry at ORION. After a sharp fight lasting several hours, during which elements of nearby rifle companies were called in, the Japanese were driven off leaving behind approximately 85 dead.


The movement was not as rapid as was desired, however, because of the many demolished bridges and poor bypasses encountered. Guerrillas had burned a number of bridges as Japanese force had withdrawn into BATAAN. Those that they had not burned were only capable of the lightest traffic or had been destroyed by the retreating enemy. Upon evidence that friendly forces were moving South the Guerrillas had constructed some bypasses, but the limited amount of material and the often poorly selected area with steep and shifty banks caused them to require constant improvement by the Engineers to allow limited traffic. Even this was subject to limitations as the changing tide only permitted use of a number of the bypasses between 0600 and 1700 hours. The work of Company A 6th Engineer (C) Battalion was excellent in overcoming these difficulties.

On 17 February, Brig Gen William C. Chase, Commanding General 38th Division, assumed direct command of the forces on the East coast of BATAAN. The 149th Infantry, 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, 138th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer), 163d Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer), 150th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer), 983d Field Artillery Battalion (240mm Gun), and 113th Engineer (C) Battalion had moved through the ZIG-ZAG PASS and were concentrating near BALANGA. With only light opposition the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry had advanced to ORION with leading ele-

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PILAR - BAGAC ROAD

▨ AREA COVERED BY AIR STRIKES 14 FEBRUARY 1945
 MUNITION EXPENDED: 63,640 GALS NAPALM, 261 TONS BOMBS, 705,600 RDS CAL. 50

SCALE 1:180,000 APPROX

[REDACTED]

ments at LIMAY, thus securing the South flank. Leading elements of the 1st and 3d Battalions 1st Infantry astride Highway 111 had pushed West into the foothills of MT SAMAT while elements of the 149th Infantry, moving to join the action, patrolled West along the trails emanating from Highway 110 between ORANI and BALANGA. The 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, given the mission of establishing contact with the 151st Infantry, effected contact on 18 February at LIMAY. By now, Highway 110, the East coast of BATAAN, and one third of Highway 111, were secure.

The majority of enemy contacts thus far had developed mainly from small parties of Japanese, mostly Navy and Service personnel, landing along the coast in an effort to escape from MANILA and the East shores of MANILA BAY. Guerrilla outposts scattered every 1000 yards or so along the coast reported these landings which were quickly investigated by our own forces. As the 38th Division and its reinforcing elements occupied areas all along Highway 110 from ORANI to LIMAY, several interesting minor engagements resulted. Service units and our Combat Engineers were frequently called upon to investigate these landings, and destroy these Japanese parties. Artillery liaison planes reconnoitered the coast line daily to direct fire on barges and small boats trying to land.


The 738th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company featured in one of these contacts. Voluntarily, a detachment of mechanics and shop personnel under the Company Commander engaged an enemy party which had landed near the mouth of BALANGA River in an effort to join the defending forces on PILAR - BAGAC Road. The enemy was soon killed or dispersed with members of the Ordnance Company receiving only light casualties. From thenceforth the 738th Ordnance Company was known as the 738th "Combat" Ordnance Company to the men in the Division.

Returning to the PILAR - BAGAC action, a coordinated attack by the 1st Infantry and the 149th Infantry was initiated on 19 February. The 3d and 2d Battalions of the 149th Infantry, in that order, began an effort to flank the enemy by moving West from BALANGA into the area of the barrio BANI. The remainder of the Regiment moved West with the 1st Battalion advancing North of Highway 111 approximately 1000 yards and parallel to the Highway.

In the meantime, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 1st Infantry continued advancing to the West, sending patrols 1000 yards along trails leading North and South from the highway. Numerous minor contacts were made, but not of enough importance to hinder the advance. The 2d Battalion 1st Infantry at ORION dispatched patrols West from points along Highway 110 in

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PILAR — BAGAC ROAD

18 - 20 FEBRUARY

SCALE: 1:180,000 APPROX

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A reinforced dugout encountered by the
149th Infantry in the PILAR-BAGAC area.

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their sector.

This same day, 19 February, the major enemy resistance during the entire PILAR - BAGAC campaign was encountered by the 3d Battalion 149th Infantry in the vicinity of BANI. Along the right bank of the ABO ABO River 1000 yards West of BANI an entrenched enemy force employing mortars, machine guns, and riflemen attempted to slow their advance. Maneuvering their forces, supported by artillery, organic mortars, and machine guns, the 3d Battalion developed this position as resistance grew stronger late in the day. At this point the 2d Battalion, having been delayed most of the day by action in front of the 3d Battalion, assisted by sending elements around left (South) flank. As the day was drawing to a close both Battalions went into perimeters for the night. Continuing the attack on 20 February, it was found that the enemy had withdrawn during the night, leaving numerous dead and quantities of supplies and equipment.

The action of 20 February was highlighted by the rapid advance of the 1st Infantry and the 149th Infantry along Highway 111. With the 1st and 3d Battalions, 1st Infantry leading and meeting only slight resistance, the town of BAGAC was entered and radio contact was established between the I & R Platoon 151st Infantry and the I & R Platoon 1st Infantry.

The I & R Platoon 151st Infantry had, on 19 February gained the overlooking hills on a coastal trail 2000 yards South of BAGAC, watched an air strike, and returned to MARIVELES. Returning on the 20th, they entered BAGAC on 21 February.

On 21 February physical contact was established between the 1st Infantry and the 151st Infantry, and the I & R Platoon 149th Infantry moved to MORON. This effectually cleared the West coast of BATAAN.

On the East coast the 2d Battalion, 152d Infantry had moved through the ZIG-ZAG PASS to ABUCAY and had taken over road and bridge guard responsibilities from ORANI to BALANGA. The 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop and the 2d Battalion 1st Infantry had secured Highway 110 to the unfordable LAMAO River just South of the town of LAMAO.

Not all of the Reconnaissance Troop and 2d Battalion 1st Infantry had been committed to the South however. Reconnaissance and combat patrols had moved West into the foothills of MT SAMAT and MT MARIVELES, meeting only slight resistance from enemy stragglers. Reconnaissance Troop observation posts were established on MT SAMAT while their patrols worked the

[REDACTED]

PANTINGAN River and the trails leading West into BAGAC.

Thus, after only seven days, the 38th Infantry Division (Reinf) with the assistance of the 1st Infantry, 1st Field Artillery Battalion, Company C 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company C 754th Tank Battalion, and Company A 6th Engineer (C) Battalion had secured control of the BATAAN Peninsula. Concurrently with the PILAR - BAGAC action, the 151st Infantry had successfully landed at MARIVELES and had secured the remainder of Highway 110 and the trail from MARIVELES to BAGAC. This action is covered in the following section.

The 1st Infantry, 1st Field Artillery Battalion, Company A 6th Engineer (C) Battalion and Company A 6th Medical Battalion were detached from the 38th Division on 21 February, passing to the control of XIV Corps. Only the mopping up phase remained in the destruction of all Japanese Forces on the BATAAN Peninsula.

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LANDING ON MARIVELES AND CORREGIDOR

FO # 5 Corrected Copy, Headquarters XI Corps 10 February 1945 gave the 38th Division the mission of landing at MARI-VELES at H-Hour on D-Day; seizing and securing a beach head and rapidly establishing control over the southern tip of BATAAN; to amphibiously land elements of the Rock Force (less 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team) at MARIVELES; reload these units for shore to shore movement and land them on SAN JOSE BEACH, CORREGIDOR ISLAND, at 1030I on D/1. Upon landing, these troops were to be attached to 503d Parachute Regimental Combat Team.

It was estimated that the enemy strength in the MARIVELES-BATAAN area would not exceed 5000, but this was based on guer-rilla reports, and proved to be grossly exaggerated.

The mission was assigned the 151st Regimental Combat Team, Col Ralf C. Paddock Commanding. On 11 February the 151st Inf-antry was relieved by the 152d Infantry in the action on the ZIG-ZAG Pass, returning the same day to a staging area North of OLONGAPO. In addition to the 151st Regimental Combat Team, the Division was assigned the mission of transporting the 3d Battalion 34th Infantry with attachments to MARIVELES, and staging them from there on D/1 to land on CORREGIDOR.

Plans were rapidly made, and on 12 February FO # 13, Headquarters 38th Infantry Division was issued. On 13 Febru-ary ammunition and supplies were gathered on the beaches at SUBIC and OLONGAPO.

The 151st Regimental Combat Team (the South Force) was composed of the following:

151st Infantry
139th Field Artillery Battalion
24th Reconnaissance Troop
Battery C, 950th AAA AW Battalion
Company B, 113th Engineer (C) Battalion
Company B, 113th Medical Battalion
Detachment 38th Signal Company
Detachment 738th Ordnance Company
Detachment 38th Div Hq and Hq Co
Detachment 38th Div MP Platoon
1st Platoon, 603d Tank Company (-)
Detachment 592d EB & SR
Detachment 592d JASCO
6th SAP (- Detachment)
Detachment 636th Ordnance Am Co

[REDACTED]

The 3d Battalion 34th Infantry had these attachments:

Battery A, 950th AAA AW Battalion
18th Portable Surgical Hospital (Reinf)
174th Ordnance Service Detachment (Bomb Disposal Squad)
Detachment 592d AB & SR
Detachment 98th Signal Battalion
Detachment 1st Plat 603d Tank Company
Detachment 592d JASCO
Detachment 6th SAP
3d Plat, Antitank Company, 34th Infantry
3d Plat, Cannon Company, 34th Infantry

For the assault shipping there were available 3 APDs, 5 LCIs, 1 IST, 10 LSMs, and 25 LCMs.

On 14 February the troops moved to the beaches, were embarked by 1500, and the convoy sailed at 1800.

H-Hour was initially set for 0900, 15 February, but due to a change in the bombing and bombardment schedule on CORREGIDOR, was set back to 1000.

Prior to H-Hour a heavy Air and Naval bombardment was carried out on CORREGIDOR and on the beach at MARIVELES to neutralize any Japanese weapons thereon. As the men entered the landing craft, one Japanese gun opened fire from the ROCK, firing 4 rounds and causing a few casualties before being smothered by Naval gunfire.

The assault waves landed at 1000 without opposition, 1st Battalion 151st Infantry on the left, 3d Battalion 151st Infantry on the right, and promptly secured the beachhead. The 2d Battalion 151st Infantry (Reserve) landed and relieved the 3d Battalion on the 1st phase line. The 3d Battalion then advanced rapidly East on Highway 110 toward CABCABEN.

The LSM carrying the 24th Reconnaissance Troop (- 1 Plat) struck a mine, causing the loss of all their equipment and heavy casualties. The other Platoon landed, and promptly began patrolling to the North.


By 1740, 15 February, the 3d Battalion had cleared the road as far as PARANG (26-49) destroying several pillboxes and machine guns enroute, and bivouacked for the night.

At the same time the 1st and 2d Battalions had secured the Regimental beachhead and patrols were working down the coast on both sides of the bay. The 3d Battalion 34th Infantry landed and bivouacked for the night.

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MARIVELES-CORREGIDOR

SCALE 1:180,000

AREA COVERED BY AIR STRIKES

MUNITIONS EXPENDED: 271 TON BOMBS 597600 RDS. CAL. 50



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Squat, bulky LSMs poured out a steady stream of men, vehicles and supplies at MARIVELES. Despite deep water, congestion on the beach was at a minimum as alligators and bulldozers quickly stalled trucks and sent them rumbling inland.

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A patrol of the 151st Infantry moves through the shambles of MARIVELES, reduced to the ground by the fierce naval and air bombardment that preceded the 151st Infantry's amphibious assault.

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An interesting event on 15 February was the report by Air Support planes. A motor column advancing rapidly down Highway 110 from the North was sighted, and permission was requested to strafe it. At first it was unidentified and might have been Japanese reinforcements; however, the Air was requested to make a close reconnaissance before attacking. The next report was "Column contains jeeps and acted in friendly manner upon approach by P-38's". The Air Support was then instructed to watch the activities of the column, but not to attack. Movement of the column was reported as far South as a river 4 miles South of LIMAY where it stopped and then returned North. It later developed that the column contained GENERAL MacARTHUR and party visiting the town from which he sailed in 1942. At this time the road South of ORION was still infested with Japanese snipers.

On 16 February the remaining enemy on Highway 110 between MARIVELES and PARANG were mopped up, the tanks assisting. The 3d Battalion captured a field piece in vicinity of PARANG, and destroyed numerous supplies and caves, killing approximately 57 enemy. A patrol consisting of infantry mounted piggy-back on a tank, followed by motorized infantry, moved rapidly to CABCABEN and secured it.

The 3d Battalion 34th Infantry (Reinforced) was reembarked, and landed on SAN JOSE Beach on CORREGIDOR to assist the 503d Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team, who had dropped on the island in the morning.

17 February was occupied with extensive patrolling netting a number of Japanese. The I & R Platoon 151st Infantry proceeded towards BAGAC, on the West coast, and foot and motor patrols worked to LAMAO on the East coast. Other patrols worked the coves and draws along the coast from CABCABEN to GUAY BAY. Some of these patrols moved in LCMS.

On 18 February contact was established at LIMAY with elements of the EAST FORCE by a patrol from 3d Battalion 151st Infantry.

The activities of 19 February netted a number of enemy killed or captured, some believed to be escaping from CORREGIDOR. The I & R Platoon returned from observing BAGAC, reporting visual observation of an air strike on BAGAC that day, but no enemy activity on the route. The Platoon left BAGAC at 1330, arriving at MARIVELES at 2230, a distance in excess of 20 miles over a rough foot trail. At the same time the Platoon of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop patrolled to the top of MT MARIVELES, but found no enemy activity.

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Platoon of 151st Infantry approaching pill box located in CORKSCREW Pass near MARIVELES.

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Tanks were employed in CORKSCREW Pass
for destroying enemy pillboxes.

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SECRET

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From 20 to 23 February, inclusive, routine patrolling was the major activity, catching and killing stray Japanese. On 21 February the I & R Platoon returned to BAGAC and made contact with the 1st Battalion 1st Infantry.

Company B 113th Engineer (C) Battalion on 23 February moved to CORREGIDOR to support the 503d Parachute Infantry in their operations.


The next day at 241145 February, the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry with 1 Platoon Cannon Company, and 1 Platoon Anti-tank Company landed on CORREGIDOR where they relieved the 3d Battalion 34th Infantry, and began the mopping up of the ROCK.

The Southern coast of BATAAN was now secure. Thereafter the 151st Infantry began active patrolling and mopping up and assaulted and captured CABALLO, EL FRAILE, and CARABAO Islands. These actions are covered in the following sections.

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
Reinforced pillbox destroyed by
151st Infantry vicinity PARANG



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MOPPING UP PERIOD

There was no exact date when the "Mopping Up" period began. For the 152d Infantry it began at the end of the ZIG-ZAG Pass fight on 14th February, when they began to patrol and clean up the ZIG-ZAG Area. For the 151st Infantry this period began on 21 February when contact was established between the 1st Infantry and the 151st Infantry at BAGAC. For the 149th Infantry it began at the same time.

All units immediately began aggressive patrolling within their sectors. In the MARIVELES area the 151st Infantry was busy catching Japanese who were escaping across the bay from MANILA or swimming from CORREGIDOR. Sufficient clothing, food and medical supplies were found to initiate the rehabilitation and treatment of the natives who flocked down from MT MARIVELES forty-eight hours after the initial landing. These supplies were found in three localities, MARIVELES, PARANG, and CABCABEN. Of interest was the finding of three cemeteries used by American Forces in 1942. The patrolling operations cleared the territory South of the LIMAY-PAYSAWAN line.


The 152d Infantry initiated aggressive patrolling and cleaning up in the ZIG-ZAG Pass area. One area in the ZIG-ZAG deserves mention. This area contained a number of Japanese positions, unable to interfere with traffic on the Hwy, but still occupied. For several days the 152d Infantry leisurely and methodically wiped these positions out, killing a good number of Japanese. A large number of caves were destroyed, and tons of rice and other supplies turned over to the PCAU. Stray Japanese were found wandering around and were killed or captured. Within a few days the area was cleared of snipers and safe for souvenir hunters. The units at OLONGAPO promptly took advantage of this, and a few days later the battle field was as clean as a park.

In Northern BATAAN the 149th Infantry sent long range patrols North and South of Highway 7 from BALSIC and BULATE. These proved very profitable in the number of enemy killed. Patrols worked North from the PILAR-BAGAC road toward MT NATIB. On a trail looping North from the road a large number of buried Japanese dumps were found, containing food, clothing, ammunition and other supplies. Two 70mm mountain guns were found and destroyed. A number of Japanese were killed in that area and around ABUCAY HACIENDA.

The 38th Reconnaissance Troop established an OP on MT SAMAT and patrolled West from ORION, LIMAY and LIMAO, and South from the PILAR-BAGAC Road. These activities drove the Japanese around, and broke them up in small ineffectual groups. Sniping at bridge guards and unit perimeters was soon stopped.

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SOUTH CHINA SEA

CAPAS TRAIL

SCALE: 1:180,000 APPROX

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Minefield on beach at Corregidor lifted by Company B 113th Engineer (C) Battalion during mopping up on the Rock. Note Q boat launching tracks.



Clearing area of Malinta Hill.

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Instructions were issued to all units, Division, Corps, and others, in the area that they would be responsible for their own local security, and that each unit would patrol daily every afternoon for at least 1000 yards around their location. Within forty eight hours all roadside sniping stopped, combat troops were not called upon to drive snipers from other units, and a fair number of Japanese killed.

Certain service units became so imbued with combat ideas that they had to be restricted in the interests of service. The most spectacular patrols were conducted by Company C 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion, who would dash across country in an M-10, the turret bristling with men carrying tommy guns. Surprisingly enough they produced results.

On 24 February the 3d Battalion 34th Infantry was relieved on CORREGIDOR by the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry, 1 Platoon Antitank Company and 1 Platoon Cannon Company 151st Infantry, and a platoon of Company B 113th Engineer (C) Battalion. They assisted the 503d Parachute Infantry in mopping up operations on the Rock, their sector being East on MALINTA Hill.

On 8 March the 503d Parachute Infantry was withdrawn from the Rock, and the entire island turned over to the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry. They continued cleaning up scattered Japanese until relieved on 13 April. During this time they furnished the troops for the CABALLO and EL FRAILE operations, which are covered in separate sections of this report.

On 10 April activity was observed around a cave on Battery Point. A patrol investigating this lost a man to enemy fire from the cave. It was decided to pour oil down one of the ventilators, and on 12 April this was started. Just as the first drum was emptied the Japanese blew up the entire cave. The explosion was terrific, smoke, dirt and rocks being thrown hundreds of feet in the air, leaving a crater over 100 feet in diameter and thirty feet deep. Nine men were killed, thirteen wounded, and four missing as a result of this.

On 7 March additional ground was given the 38th Division to clear. The Division area now included all of BATAAN, most of ZAMBALES and PAMPANGA, and part of TARLAC Provinces. The mission of destroying the Japanese forces West of FT STOTSENBURG and CLARK FIELD was assigned to the Division at the same time.

Regimental boundaries were redesignated, (see sketch) and the 149th Infantry given the mission to destroy all Japanese forces in the CLARK FIELD - FT STOTSENBURG area. This action developed into a full scale operation, and is described in a separate section of this report.

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On 27 February, the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry, patrolling in the BOTOLAN-POONBATO-MAGUISGUIS area, was instructed to move East over the CAPAS-O'DONNELL Trail and contact units of the 43d Division at TIAONG. The 28th was spent in arranging for carriers and supply. The 2d Battalion moved out, F Company leading, on 1 March. On 4 March contact was made, effectively sealing the Northern side of the Division area. Further actions of this Battalion are covered in the account of the STOTSENBERG Operation.

As the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry moved East, the 3d Battalion took over the area. The 1st Battalion 152d Infantry remained in the SAN MARCELINO area, and the two units actively patrolled and cleaned out the scattered Japanese in the territory West of MT PINATUBO. A strong patrol from the 1st Battalion 152d Infantry was dispatched to CAVALRY Pass on the top of MT PINATUBO. This patrol initially was supplied by air drop. This stopped the movement of the Japanese over the pass and Southeast from MT PINATUBO towards SAN MARCELINO. The patrol was maintained until 23 April when the 6th Division took over the sector.

Many contacts were made by the 3d Battalion 152d Infantry and the 38th Reconnaissance Troop in the BOTOLAN-IBA area, and a good number of Japanese killed.

The 151st Infantry between 7 March and 26 April had furnished troops to garrison CORREGIDOR, and to conduct the CABALLO, EL FRAILE and CARABAO operations. On 20 March the road and bridge guards between SAN FERNANDO and MANILA were assigned them. This occupied such a large number of the strength of the 151st Infantry, that long range patrols on BATAAN could not be organized.

In the middle of April, PW's reported that the scattered Japanese in the MT NATIB area had assembled. The 3d Battalion 151st Infantry was assembled on the BAGAC-PILAR Road, the 2d Battalion in the ABUCAY HACIENDA-BALANGA area, both to advance toward MT NATIB, destroying all Japanese found. The movement of the units was slow due to difficult terrain and was continuing on 27 April when the 151st Infantry was relieved by elements of the 6th Infantry Division. Company K 151st Infantry remained North of the PILAR-BAGAC Road to maintain contact until the 2d Battalion 63d Infantry, 6th Infantry Division could resume the advance on MT NATIB, and was relieved 1 May.

Numerous lessons were learned in this movement in regards to supply. A suitable trail, even though heavy terrain, must be built right behind advancing troops. Also, the use of guerrilla and native carriers is necessary to furnish

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excellent Non-Com's to control them and ample guards to keep them on the job.

The advance of the 149th Infantry up the SACOBIA River and along the ridge North thereof, toward MT PINATUBO drove many small parties of Japanese down from the mountain. This was particularly true about the middle of April, when scattered groups appeared in the ANGELES-PORAC-FLORIDABLANCA area. These groups were encountered and killed by patrols from various Division units. The 38th Military Police Platoon and 38th Signal Company, whose duties took them over the area daily, quickly developed a rivalry in the number of Japanese killed. This continued up to the time the 38th Infantry Division was relieved in that sector on 30 April.

During the period from 10 March until 30 April, the pressure in the MT PINATUBO area forced a large number of Japanese over the North West slopes of MT PINATUBO down into the VILLAR-MAGUISGUIS-POONBATO area. These parties were intercepted by patrols from the 2d and 3d Battalions 152d Infantry. It was decided to plug this escape route at the source, so the 3d Battalion 152d Infantry was directed to move East along the MORUNAL River, and contact the 2d Battalion 149th Infantry and the 1st Battalion 149th Infantry, who were closing in on the Japanese from the North and South respectively. This action is covered in detail in the account of the STOTSENBERG operation.

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CABALLO BAY

MANILA BAY

MORTAR PITS
AND
TUNNELS

E G

HILL 1

E
HILL 3
28 MAR

200


100

HILL 2

2
151
27 MAR

ISLAND OF CABALLO P.I.

SCALE: 1:50,000 APPROX.



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THE ASSAULT AND CAPTURE OF CABALLO ISLAND

FO # 10 Headquarters XI Corps dated 23 March 1945 assigned to the 38th Division the mission of seizing CABALLO Island and destroying all enemy forces thereon. G-2 XI Corps estimated the enemy strength on CABALLO Island at 522.

The 151st Infantry was assigned the mission, and the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry under command of Lt. Col. (then Major) Paul R. LeMasters was selected as the assault Battalion. Artillery support was furnished by the 163rd Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How) (less Battery B) from positions on CORREGIDOR and Battery A 150th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How) from positions at CABCABEN on the mainland of BATAAN.

From 0650 to 0830 27 March 1945 a concentration of bombs was dropped on CABALLO Island. Supporting weapons (artillery and 81mm mortars) blanketed all likely targets from 0835 to 0855. Two DD's fired direct into enemy emplacements.

Company E 151st Infantry landed at 270900 March and immediately occupied Hill 1. Company G followed in column with the remainder of the 2d Battalion (less Company F). Company F remained on BLACK BEACH, CORREGIDOR, alerted to reinforce the assault forces if necessary. The advance continued to the foot of Hill 2 where Company E received heavy 20mm and knee mortar fire. Further direct advance up the hill was impossible as the face of the hill was covered by grazing fire from the West pit. Company E maneuvered to the South side of the island to attempt climbing the steep slopes. Supporting 60 and 81mm mortars attempted to silence the fire coming from two large pits on Hill 2.

At 1200 Company E was 25 yards from the crest of the hill. The route from their position to the crest of Hill 2 was a two foot ledge that the enemy covered by machine gun fire from the pits. It was decided to send a platoon under cover os smoke to the top of the hill, so supporting mortar fire was called for.

Considerable difficulty was encountered in resupply of Company E as all supplies had to be hoisted to the top of the edge ridge across which the men were to advance. However, enough had arrived to warrant sending the platoon across the ledge. The 163rd Field Artillery Battalion laid a smoke screen across the ledge and single file the troops advanced, the Japanese firing blindly into the smoke. At the end of the day all the top surface of Hills 1 and 2 were occupied by Companies E and G. The pits were contained by fire to prevent



the enemy from escaping.

On the morning of 28 March the resupply and evacuation of Company E was again the foremost problem. One LCM was brought to the North side of the island and with use of a rope gun, a rope was catapulted to the top of Hill 2. One rope was not enough to meet the situation so an air drop of rope and water was attempted. After several trials the drop was successful, which relieved the situation considerably.

Company E continued to move the remainder of the Company across the ledge under cover of smoke, and the forward elements pushed up towards Hill 3, occupying the ground for the night.


On the morning of 29 March Company E sent patrols to the West of the island with no enemy contact. This secured all the island except the mortar pits and tunnels on Hill 2, which contained the remaining Japanese garrison. The remainder of the destruction of the pit on Hill 2. Until the final destruction of the pits all supplies for the troops on top of Hill 2 and 3 were hoisted up from the beach at the foot of the North cliff.

The final reduction of CABALLO Island was made difficult by an impasse occasioned by the occupation of the Japanese garrison of the mortar pits, where weapons were so sited as to command all approaches to the pits (see sketch), with the exception of one vent which was most difficult of access. Troops approaching the craters on the slopes were exposed to intense small arms and 20mm cannon fire. Access from the top of Hill 2 was denied due to grazing fire constantly placed by Japanese forces up the slope to the crest. It was possible to put mortar fire into the pit; however, when this was done, the Japanese merely withdrew to the safety of the tunnels and, of necessity, our Infantry was forced to withdraw down the outer slope to avoid their own fragmentation. The Japanese were able to come out of the tunnels upon cessation of our mortar fire in time to prevent our Infantry from moving up the slope and into the pit where they might block out the tunnel entrances. The siting of Japanese weapons in the tunnel entrances were so arranged that they were mutually supporting.

Investigation later showed that the Japanese had constructed two sandbag blast walls in each tunnel, so constructed that weapons could fire over them (see sketch).

Tanks were brought over to CABALLO on 3 April, and a road constructed by the 113th Engineers to enable them to reach the edge of the pits. It was found that the tank guns would not depress sufficiently to bear on the tunnels. If the tanks ad-

**CROSS SECTION OF MORTAR PITS
ON CABALLO ISLAND**



[REDACTED]

vanced far enough to tilt down the slopes, they began to slide down into the pits. For this reason the tanks were withdrawn.

That night a banzai attack was made against the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry resulting in 86 Japanese killed.

Lt. Col. Lobit, regimental commander of the 151st Infantry, conceived the idea of pouring diesel oil down the one vent to which there was access and igniting it. In order to accomplish this, a long and painfully laborious system of pulling oil drums up the steep slope by the use of ropes and pulleys was employed. Sufficient oil could not be taken up on the slope, nor stored on the top of the slope to permit sufficient volume at any one time to produce the desired effect.

Then the idea was conceived of placing oil into the pits by the use of pumps from a vessel of considerable gallonage capacity. It was at first hoped that a large Navy or Army fuel barge could be obtained for the purpose. When this was found not obtainable, the idea was modified to the mounting of Navy pontoons on an LCM. The technical details of design were turned over to the Division Engineer.

On preliminary survey, the Division Engineer obtained the following equipment:

- One LCM
- Two Navy Cubes
- One AvGas pump of 110 hp capacity with the necessary pipe and fittings
- Sufficient lengths of AvGas pipeline to reach the top of the mortar pit from the waterline.

The device familiarly became known as the "Rube Goldberg" (see sketch). On the initial try-out 5 April 1945, the Division Engineers, assisted by personnel from an Engineer Petroleum Distribution Company, connected the pipe line with flexible joints, ran it up the slope, hooked it up to the pump in the LCM, tried out the pump with sea water first, and when it was found it would work, proceeded to pump a mixture of diesel oil and gasoline into the mortar pit. Capacity was limited, of course, totaling not more than 2,600 gallons of fuel. When the cubes had been emptied, Infantry elements lobbed WP mortar shells into the pit, thus igniting the mixture. The results were most gratifying. A tremendous volume of flame came out of the pit and, subsequently, the explosion of small arms ammunition could be heard, followed by seven explosions, apparently of a picric acid base explosive. A drain whose existence had not been known blew out, and some of the oil escaped and burned on the North beach.

[REDACTED]

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Fastening pipe together to pump oil into the mortar pits on CABALLO Island.



Mortar pits burning on CABALLO Island.

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The next day small arms fire was received from the West tunnel entrance, so it was decided to repeat the "hot oil" treatment, after carefully plugging the drain.

On 6 April additional oil was pumped into the pits and ignited, followed by intense fires and the explosion of small arms ammunition. During the evening there were several muffled underground explosions.


On 7 April the oil was pumped into the pits again. At the same time a 500 pound and a 250 pound demolition bomb were lowered down the ventilator. A 500 pound charge was also placed at the East tunnel entrance. The oil, the bombs and the charge were successively ignited resulting in an enormous volume of flame and smoke, followed by a terrific explosion. The fire burned into the night, during which time additional explosions were heard and felt.

On 13 April, after the pits had cooled, a patrol entered, counted 50 dead Japanese, and reported complete destruction within the pits.

When, to continue the mopping up phase, the 2d Battalion was relieved by the 1st Battalion, the total enemy was 229 killed, 50 found dead and 3 Prisoners of War. This was a grand total of 279 killed and 3 Prisoners of War.


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THE "RUBE GOLDBERG"



FLEXIBLE HOSE

· LCM OIL BARGE ·



VENT

PRIME TANK

FILLING CAP

NAVY CUBE

NAVY CUBE

6" SUCTION

110 HP GASOLINE ENGINE

4" DISCHARGE

3" FIRE HOSE

[REDACTED]

THE ASSAULT AND DESTRUCTION OF EL FRAILE (FT. DRUM)

FO 314, Headquarters XI Corps, 19 April 1945, directed the 38th Division to seize EL FRAILE Island (Fort Drum) and destroy all Japanese forces therein.

FORT DRUM is a concrete block in the shape of a ship, built on a reef, EL FRAILE, in the entrance to MANILA BAY. It was built between 1912 and 1922 of reinforced concrete, and mounted two turrets with two 14" guns each and double 6" guns in casemates on each side. These had been rendered inoperative when the American forces surrendered in 1942.

The walls were 18 to 30 feet thick, and the deck 15 to 18 feet. The inside was divided into three decks, connected by stairways.

The only entrance was through a sally-port which extended from side to side on the stern (East) end. This connected with a gallery that ran longitudinally into the rooms inside. A naval patrol investigating the Fort several days previous was fired on by a machine gun and several men in the sally-port were killed or wounded.

It was decided the best means of attack would be the "Rube Goldberg" oil pumping device. Plans of the Fort were studied (see sketches) and every available source of information canvassed to learn the arrangement of the rooms, powder rooms, doors, stairways and ventilators. Invaluable information was received from Col. J. R. Burns, Sixth Army CWO, who had been in the Fort in 1941 to plan the proposed gas proofing and air conditioning equipment.

From Col. Burns it was learned that there were ventilator vents on the top, from which ducts lead to all parts of the interior. Based on this, Lt. Col. Lobit, Commanding Officer 151st Infantry, decided that the best means of attack would be to land on the top, secure it, pump oil down the vents, ignite the oil and withdraw.


This posed the question of how to reach the deck, forty feet above the water line. The wall was vertical except for the last five feet which sloped inward at a 60 degree angle, making the use of scaling ladders almost impossible.

A joint conference was held with representatives of the Navy, the Assistant Division Commander, G-3, G-4 and Col. Lobit. At this meeting it was suggested that a ladder be placed on a landing craft capable of reaching the top, but in scaling it off, it was found that the men would still be too far away

██████████

FORT DRUM

EL FRAILE ISLAND P.I.




B - BARRACKS ELEV FLOOR	16' 9"	B' - BARRACKS	11' 2"
M - MESS ROOM	7' 3"	M' - MAGAZINE	2' 3"
E - ENGINE ROOM	2' 0"	T - TANK ROOM	6' 9"

SCALE : 1 INCH = 50 FEET

SHEET # 1


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FORT DRUM




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SCALE: 1 INCH = 50 FEET

SHEET # 2



LANDING RAMP

FORT DRUM

EL FRAILE (FORT DRUM) OPERATION
"THE TROJAN HORSE" SCALE 1" = 16'

SECRET



Assault party landing on top of FT DRUM.



Effect of cruiser gun fire on casemate. Japanese fired rifles from these holes upon assault party until silenced by automatic fire from LSM. Note escape ropes.

SECRET

[REDACTED]

from the top. It was then decided to make a draw bridge, on the top of an LSM, which would be lowered to the top of Fort Drum, thus enabling the assault crew to land on the top (see sketch).

Lt. Comdr. Pattie, USN, was directed by the Comdr. 7th Amphibious Force to assist in constructing this device. A large part of its ultimate success was due to his enthusiastic cooperation. The 113th Engineer (C) Battalion was directed to construct the draw bridge, and the 1st Platoon of Company A moved to SUBIC to do the work.

This new model assault landing ship was promptly dubbed the "Trojan Horse". It was completed and moved to CORREGIDOR, arriving the morning of 12 April in time for a rehearsal that afternoon. The assault team was composed of the 1st Platoon Company F 151st Infantry and a Platoon of Company A 113th Engineer (C) Battalion.

On the morning of 12 April, Fort Drum was shelled by a cruiser to see if a hole could be knocked in the wall to permit better entrance of the oil or explode the magazines. This was unsuccessful, although the casemates were punctured.

On the morning of 13 April at 0934 the "Trojan Horse" LSM accompanied by the "Rube Goldberg" LCM moved alongside the Fort. Ineffective small arms fire was received from the holes in the casemates. The draw bridge was lowered, the covering party rushed over the top deck, secured it, followed by the engineers with the oil line and a 600 pound demolition charge.

At 1000 the pumping was started, the demolitions were set in an opening found in the deck in the rear, the fuse ignited and the assault party withdrew.

After pumping 400 gallons of oil the hose line burst. The broken section of hose was cut out while at the same time the Engineer Officer, the Commander of the 2d Battalion 151st Infantry and several enlisted men rushed back on the Fort and cut the fuse. Since it was noted that some of the oil was escaping from the 6" gun casemate, the oil line was shifted to a ventilator on the opposite side of the deck (see sketch) and the nozzle sandbagged down. The ignition charge and fuse were replaced, the pumping renewed and the party withdrew. The demolitions were set to explode at 1048.

At the scheduled time large volumes of black smoke came from the Fort indicating that the oil was burning fiercely. This changed to white and then yellow smoke, followed by a

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


Ready to start pumping oil.




Placing hose nozzle and connecting demolitions.


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Before



After

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violent explosion which rent the deck of the Fort, sent steel plates hundreds of feet in the air and caused smoke to issue from every vent, gun muzzle and opening.

For four days the interior was too hot to permit entrance; on the fifth, smoke prevented any descent below the first deck. On the 18th of April patrols completed the investigation of the interior finding 60 burned and suffocated Japanese.

This highly successful operation was executed with only minor injuries and at a minimum of effort, due to careful detailed planning, close coordination and the effective use of these two novel amphibious assault crafts.

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CARABAO ISLAND OPERATION

16 April 1945

To attack, seize and occupy CARABAO Island, and to destroy all hostile forces thereon, was the mission assigned the 38th Infantry Division by FO #13, Headquarters XI Corps, 3 April 1945. The G-2 estimate of the defense force strength was 336, the majority of which were believed to be enemy machine gun units.


Information of recent excavations was partially confirmed by PT boat and aerial reconnaissance on 9 April. Several emplacements on the West side of the island were thought to be occupied although movement was not conspicuous.

C-Day and H-Hour was designated 160930 April 1945. The 151st Infantry was given the mission and the 1st Battalion under command of Maj Morton K. Sitton, was selected as the assault battalion. Attached supporting troops for the assault force were: 1 Platoon Company C 113th Engineer (C) Battalion, Detachment Company B 113th Medical Battalion, 18th Support Aircraft Party, 239th JASCO, Artillery Forward Observer and Liaison Party, and 1 oil pump and crew with LCM from the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. The 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment furnished and manned the assault landing craft, and furnished amphibious evacuation and supply for the operation.

The Supporting Weapons Group was composed of the 139th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm How), Battery A 150th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm How) with 1 Platoon 50 Caliber Machine Guns, 81mm mortar platoons from Companies D and M 151st Infantry, 1 Platoon Antitank Company 151st Infantry, 2 Platoons Cannon Company 151st Infantry, Detachment 113th Engineer (C) Battalion, and 1 Platoon Company C 82d Chemical Battalion (4.2" Chemical Mortars). Direct support was furnished by this Supporting Weapons Group from positions vicinity TERNATE on the mainland South of MANILA BAY.

Air support from C-6 to C-Day consisted of daily bombardment with medium bombers and fighter craft dropping 1000 lb bombs and executing strafing attacks. On C-4 moderate but inaccurate anti-aircraft fire was received by the attacking planes. Devastating air strikes were made covering the entire surface of the island. The earth was torn and crumbled to the extent that great land slides closed up many tunnel entrances.

The use of C-47s, out of which were dropped 56 gal drums of NaPalm, was highly successful. Guns and emplacements were



[REDACTED]

destroyed, much of the foliage and vegetation removed, and the island left scorched and barren.

Reconnaissance was conducted to locate positions for the Artillery on the mainland, possible enemy shore positions, landing beaches, walls, and enemy works on CARABAO, including mines, underwater obstacles, and wire; and to determine if the sea wall had to be breached to permit bulldozers, tanks, and SPM's to be landed and moved across beach. PT boats accompanied the reconnaissance party. On C-3 Artillery and 81mm mortars landed on the selected positions on the South shore of MANILA BAY. The Artillery registered in, then fired on targets of opportunity and night harassing fires from C-2 to H-1.

The landing beach selected was mid-way on the eastern coast and consisted of a flat stretch of ground 200 yards long by 75 yards deep. A vertical sea wall five feet high ran along the waters edge. This flat stretch was surrounded by vertical shale cliffs, in the face of which were four large caves. In the face of one cliff a sloping road had been cut out prior to the war. The beach on the North end of the island where a landing might have been attempted was well covered with mutually supporting emplacements, barbed wire and natural obstacles. High walls had been constructed at the waters edge at the entrance of all accessible ravines. Tunnels and emplacements built at the waters edge commanded the approaches. Precipitous cliffs a hundred feet high rose out of the sea at other points making assault impossible.

Naval gunfire C-1 and C-Day breached the sea wall and closed all possible caves that could furnish opposition to the landing. The coordination of Naval gunfire, fire from Rocket Boats, and the supporting Artillery was minutely planned and very well executed.

Between 0830 - 0900 C-Day air strikes with strafing were conducted to destroy emplacements and drive the enemy into caves. From 0900 - 0920 Naval gunfire bombarded the landing beach and the cliffs adjacent thereto. Between 0920 - 0930 Naval Rocket Fire gave close support while Artillery and Naval Fire neutralized all parts of the island.

Assault waves reached the hostile shore on schedule without opposition. The plan of attack called for two platoons to land, advance across the flat, and while one platoon secured the beachhead, the other to advance rapidly up the inclined road, and secure the top of the ridge where the road reached the top. Following units were to throw a block across the island on the North side of the connecting ridge, while the remainder of the Battalion secured the Southern end of the island.

[REDACTED]



CARABAO Island, showing confined landing beach, the road up the side of the cliff and old emplacements.



Assault Team advancing up steep road from landing beach.

[REDACTED]

Then the Western peninsula, followed by the Northern end, was to be secured. This was followed out to the letter and by 1140 the entire surface of the island was secured.

No enemy was encountered. The Engineers brought a bulldozer up to the high ground with winches and cables. The troops then proceeded to demolish all emplacements, covered all tunnel entrances, and ignited several enemy ammunition dumps resulting in large underground explosions.

On the second day an investigation of all remaining emplacements, tunnels, and caves, disclosed the fact that CARABAO Island had not been occupied by the enemy for several days.

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M-7


STOTSENBURG AREA

The 40th Division as one Division in the M-1 Operation had seized CLARK FIELD and FT STOTSENBURG on the drive via TARLAC and SAN FERNANDO into MANILA. The Japanese forces who had attempted to defend CLARK FIELD and FT STOTSENBURG had been pushed West into the foothills of MT PINATUBO.

Approximately two weeks prior to the 38th Division participation in the attack West of STOTSENBURG, the 43d Division relieved the 40th Division in that sector and came under the control of XI Corps. Field Order 8, Headquarters XI Corps, dated 7 March 1945, extended the boundaries of the 38th Division to include the STOTSENBURG area. Leaving the 169th Regimental Combat Team, Companies B and C 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company B 82d Chemical Battalion, the 43d Division was withdrawn for other operations in the Corps sector.


Prior to this on 24 February the 152d Infantry was given the mission to advance elements North on Highway 7, from vicinity SAN ANTONIO and SAN FELIPE on the West coast of the ZAMBALES Province, into the BOTOLAN - IBA - PALAUIG BAY sector. They were also given the mission of guarding CLARK FIELD with one rifle company. Beginning on 25 February 1945 the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry, 163d Field Artillery Battalion (less B Battery), and the 38th Reconnaissance Troop moved into BOTOLAN with only slight resistance. On 27 February the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry was directed to proceed East and contact elements of the 43d Infantry Division in the vicinity of TIAONG, and prevent the enemy from moving North from the PINATUBO area. Followed by the Field Artillery and proceeded by 1 Platoon 38th Reconnaissance Troop as far as POONBATO, and MAGUISGUIS, the Battalion began a long and laborious march East over the CAPAS Trail from POONBATO on 1 March. This trail from BOTOLAN over the CABUSILAN Range to TIAONG, O'DONNELL, and CAPAS was an old prewar cavalry trail and training ground. As the trail was so rugged and steep that only lightly equipped small bodies of troops could move over it, the Battalion had to be supplied by native carriers and carabao carts. At 1510 on 4 March Company F, the Battalion leading element, contacted patrols of the 43d Reconnaissance Troop at TIAONG. Company G arrived TIAONG next day and the remainder of the Battalion on 6 March.

This proved to be a surprise move on the part of our forces, as a great number of enemy were found along the river draws and were killed as they were cooking meals or sleeping in preparation for movement by night. Contact with the 43d Reconnaissance Troop and elements of 2d Battalion 172d Infantry



STOTSENBURG AREA
 SITUATION PRIOR TO RELIEF OF 43rd DIV.
 SCALE 1:130,000 APPROX.

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STOTSENBURG AREA

SITUATION ON RELIEF OF 43rd DIV

10 MARCH 1945

SCALE 1:180,000 APPROX.

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was established in the vicinity of TIAONG thus entirely blocking the CAPAS Trail from mass movement of the enemy out of the STOTSENBURG area.

With the mission to press the attack against enemy forces in STOTSENBURG area, the 149th Regimental Combat Team (less 2d Battalion), the 139th Field Artillery Battalion, the 150th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 38th Reconnaissance Troop were moved to vicinity STOTSENBURG and BAMBAN. These units plus those attached from the 43d Division were placed under the command of Brigadier General William Spence, Commanding General 38th Division Artillery. The Division Artillery Staff assisted by a detachment of officers and men from the Division Headquarters became the 38th Division Advance (Task Force). The CP opened at FT STOTSENBURG at 1800, 10 March 1945.

Upon organization of the 38th Division Advance (Task Force) the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry and Company C 152d Infantry who were guarding CLARK FIELD, were attached and remained to assist in the destruction of enemy forces in that area. Company E remained South of TIAONG in the CAPAS Trail area to block the enemy's escape routes. The 2d Battalion 149th Infantry had previously been sent into the FISHPOND area South of SEXMOAN, MASANTOL, HAGONUY, and MALOLOS. Using small boats, barges, and land patrols, numerous small enemy parties were contacted and destroyed as they were trying to escape from the fight in MANILA.

Composition of the 38th Division Advance (Task Force) with indicated attachments was as follows:

- Detachment 38th Division Headquarters
- 38th Division Artillery Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
- 139th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm Howitzer)
- 150th Field Artillery Battalion (155mm Howitzer)
- 2d Battalion 152d Infantry attached Company C 152d Infantry
- 1 Platoon 38th Quartermaster Company
- Company B 82d Chemical Battalion (Tactical control only)
- 149th Regimental Combat Team
 - 149th Infantry
 - 138th Field Artillery Battalion
 - Company E 152d Infantry
 - Company A 113th Engineer Battalion
 - Company A 113th Medical Battalion
 - Company C 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion
 - 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop

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149th Regimental Combat Team (Continued)
1 Platoon Company B 82d Chemical Battalion
1st Platoon Company D 113th Medical Battalion
169th Regimental Combat Team
169th Infantry
169th Field Artillery Battalion
Company B 118th Engineer Battalion
Company B 640th Tank Destroyer Battalion
Collecting Company 118th Medical Battalion
3d Platoon Company D 118th Medical Battalion
1 Platoon Company B 82d Chemical Battalion

The terrain in the STOTSENBURG area was unlike any thus far fought over in the M-7 Operation. Small streams flowed between high ridges and individual hills covered with coogan grass. Bamboo thickets and scrubby trees covered numerous paths and caves along the streams used as supply and evacuation routes by the enemy. Overlooking these paths were chalk cliffs containing caves and tunnels from which the enemy fired upon our advancing troops and then took cover in as artillery and mortar fire was dropped upon them.

On certain of these caves only direct fire by artillery, self-propelled cannon, and antitank weapons would neutralize them. Assault teams could find no approach to them because of the bare slopes covered by fire from caves in adjacent ridges.

Caves containing riflemen, machine guns, and 20mm and 40mm dual purpose weapons also contained stores of food, clothing, ammunition, and explosives. For water supply, small parties descended winding paths down the cliffs into the small streams at night. Thus the enemy was able to exist almost indefinitely.


Some 17000 yards West of BAMBAN and to the rear of these bare ridges and knolls were higher and steeper ridges forming the foothills of MT PINATUBO. Thick forests and dense undergrowth afforded the enemy natural camouflage for observation posts, command posts and well dug in strong points. In this area abundant camouflage materials were available.

Supply roads became more difficult to construct and maintain as our forces advanced. More and more engineers were required to push the supply routes well forward and to furnish demolition teams for destroying the caves and tunnels taken by the forward elements. The advance of the infantry was dependent to a great extent on the advance of supply roads by the engineers. A great number of caves containing large amounts of explosives had to be blown after advancing troops and supporting units were clear of the area.



UNCLASSIFIED

Engineers building supply road
West of FT. STOTSENBURG



Details of mine field neutralized
at the West end of Jap Motor Pool.

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SECRET



Supply road in STOTSENBURG Area. This shows type of terrain over which troops had to advance.

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[REDACTED]

Moving farther back into the mountains advancing elements found steeper ridges, commonly called hogbacks, extending between the heads of small streams and rivers. Stream beds headed up into dead-end gorges. Often leading elements came face to face with sheer cliffs and blank walls so precipitous as to afford no further advance.

At this point engineers with bulldozers were no longer able to construct supply roads. Native carriers were then employed extensively as carrying parties to provide the fighting men with food, water, and ammunition. Near the point where the enemy's supply lines became shorter and their ability to concentrate upon a stiffer resistance became greater, our supply and evacuation routes were narrow rough carrier paths some 4000 yards in length. Some routes crossed valleys 500 feet deep and less than half a mile from crest to crest. Carrier parties moved slowly, as a foot slip along the slopes often gave the individual serious bodily injuries.

Altogether, the terrain in the STOTSENBURG area formed numerous defensive zones capable of withstanding our concentrated and coordinated assaults for days.

When the 38th Division troops completed the movement into the STOTSENBURG area on 10 March, the 169th Infantry with attached troops remained in place, and the 149th Infantry with attached troops relieved the 172d Infantry who were disposed as shown on sketch. The 43d Division Engineers had constructed and improved supply routes to these points.

The TIAONG area had been occupied by the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry. Company E, with elements at TIAONG and on the ridge 3500 yards to the South, remained in that area. The remainder of the Battalion was moved to the vicinity of FT STOTSENBURG and became the Task Force Reserve.

On 11 and 12 March the 149th Regimental Combat Team had advanced elements of the 1st Battalion 3500 yards along the MALAGO River to the base of SUGAR LOAF Hill against light resistance, the 3d Battalion assisted by Tank Destroyers moved 1600 yards South along the West fork of MALAGO River and the East branch of the BANGAT River. Moderate resistance was met by the 3d Battalion as they destroyed a great number of caves. One company back tracked around the left (East) flank to clean out the draws and destroy the bypassed areas. The 2d Battalion 169th Infantry had captured FOX OP and the East end of SACOBIA RIDGE on 9 March, from FOX OP they now cleaned out the draws to the North. Elements of the antitank Company 169th Infantry held the hills of OPs 2, 3, 5, and 7 facing the JAP MOTOR POOL area. Company E 152d Infantry held the ridges 3500 yards South

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
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of TIAONG, sending a Platoon in an unsuccessful effort to contact 149th Infantry.

For the next three days, 13, 14 and 15 March, all elements made advances 400 - 500 yards per day against increasing resistance. More noticeable gains were made by the 1st and 3d Battalions 169th Infantry. Company G 152d Infantry on 13 March was attached to the 2d Battalion 169th Infantry for a coordinated attack with their Company G along the draw between SACOBIA RIDGE and FOX OP Hill. This combined attack gained approximately 2000 yards on 14 March. In a coordinated attack the 3d Battalion 169th Infantry moved along the CAUAYAN River draw to the North base of SPENCE RIDGE while the 1st Battalion gained the draws leading into the ridge on the East. SPENCE RIDGE was not taken. Company B took an East nose of the ridge but was forced to withdraw because of the heavy enemy resistance and the lateness of the day. On 14 March the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry (less Company E), was ordered into the area of FLAT TOP Hill and was attached to the 149th Infantry. This Battalion moved South on the BANGAT River to the base of HIGH PEAK (BM 26). Over 1240 Japanese were killed during these three days, the greatest accumulation being 403 by the 149th Infantry on 13 March. Our own casualties were light.

Artillery and mortars played a great part in this action so far. With one light Battalion in direct support of each of the two Regiments and one light and one medium Battalion in general support, they had selected positions where massed concentrations could be delivered upon any slope of these narrow ridges. •As an example of the artillery ammunition expended, 2632 rounds were fired on the 13th, 2498 rounds on the 14th, and 3504 rounds on the 15th.

81mm Mortar Platoons firing in battery found excellent positions on the reverse slopes of the many hills and ridges from which they poured round upon round into the enemy defenses. On 13, 14, and 15 March over 1025 rounds of ammunition was expended, 5% of which was white phosphorous. Numerous brush fires were started by the white phosphorous shells, burning off the underbrush and camouflage over the Japanese emplacements, and allowing our troops to locate their positions.

Again on 16 and 17 March appreciable advances were made toward MT PINATUBO. Greater gains were made in the 149th Infantry sector as the 3d Battalion 169th Infantry on the 169th Infantry's right (North) flank was slowly being pinched out. The mission of the 1st Battalion 169th Infantry had been taken over by the combined advances of the 1st Battalion 149th Infantry and the 2d Battalion 169th Infantry. The 1st Battalion was then ordered to exploit the Task Force Southern flank



SULA

MORIONES

TARLAC

RCN 38
17 MAR

C 169
17 MAR

RICE FIELDS

RICE FIELDS

O'DONNELL

CAPAS

BAMBANG

38 ADV
17 MAR

TIAONG

E 152

149

138

HIGH PEAK

15 MAR

152

FLAT TOP

17 MAR

MALAGO R

MARIMLA R

CAUAYAN R

SACOBIA R

169

169

169

169

169

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CABLISILAN MOUNTAINS

SAWTOOTH RIDGE

MT. PINATUBO

SPENCE RIDGE

SACOBIA RIDGE

JAP MOTOR POOL

MT. DORST

CLARK FIELD

FORT STOTSSENBURG

ANGELES

38 TF
15 MAR

169
15 MAR

139

150

169

169

169

169

169

169

169

169

169

38 TF
15 MAR

169
15 MAR

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South of the JAP MOTOR POOL. Company A moved on this mission while the remainder of the Battalion consolidated and reorganized in position. Company B 82d Chemical Battalion, who had been supporting the Task Force with one Platoon to each of the two Regiments, was now ordered to reconsolidate and support the 1st Battalion 169th Infantry. On 17 March they were in place and delivered 366 rounds in massed concentrations for that Battalion.


The Battalions of the 149th Infantry pushed into the beginning of the thickly overgrown area of the MARIMLA, MALAGO, and BANGAT Rivers, while elements of the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry were sent around the North side of HIGH PEAK. For all Battalions the total enemy killed now mounted to 2167 and 27 Prisoners of War.

The enemy by this time had settled into highly organized positions South and West of the JAP MOTOR POOL, on LEWIS Ridge, SACOBIA Ridge, SAWTOOTH Ridge and SPENCE Ridge. Only by assistance of heavy artillery and mortar barrages were the infantry able to move into these entrenchments, neutralizing them with fragmentation and white phosphorous hand grenades. Engineer demolition teams followed with prepared charges to blow them and prevent reoccupation by the enemy. 3970 rounds of artillery ammunition were fired on these two days.

To overcome a difficult supply problem, the Engineers, who by this time consisted of the greater portion of 113th Engineer (C) Battalion and Company B 118th Engineer (C) Battalion constructed roads into the forward areas capable of carrying the heaviest traffic. Bulldozers followed the assaulting units, sometimes appearing to be an organic part of the Companies.

Signal units composed of a detachment of the 38th Signal Company and the organic communication personnel of the Regiments had by this time assumed enormous responsibilities in maintaining wire and radio communications into the forward zones. By constructing laterals and by continuous maintenance of all lines, communications were never out.

The hills and ridge lines in the STOTSENBURG area decrease in ruggedness and elevation as you go North and Northeast from MT PINATUBO. Streams flowed in this direction into the O'DONNELL and MORIONES Rivers, thence into the area of rice paddies at CAPAS and TARLAC. These stream lines formed natural escape routes for small enemy parties. Starting with limited rations the Japanese infiltrated through our front lines at night and into the O'DONNELL River area. There they rested and replenished supplies from the rice fields among the many



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evacuated barrios. Prisoners of war taken in this area stated that they were from the STOTSENBURG area and that they were trying to rejoin their forces at BAGUIO. Captured maps and documents indicated trails in that direction.

Here, the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop enters the picture. Attached to 149th Infantry, the Troop was ordered to patrol the areas along the CAPAS Trail and O'DONNELL River to TIAONG and the MORIONES River area West from TARLAC. This was an ideal mission for a Reconnaissance Troop with its highly mobile fire power. Co C 169th Infantry moved to O'DONNELL to assist the Reconnaissance Troop, but was returned when the reported enemy force failed to materialize. Stream beds and barrios were searched daily resulting in many light contacts and many enemy killed in this sector.

March 18, 19, and 20 found all Battalions of the Force in constant contact with the enemy. The 2d Battalion 149th Infantry had accomplished its mission in the Fishpond area and on 20 March took over the FOX OP - SPENCE RIDGE part of the sector of the 2d Battalion 169th Inf. The 2d Battalion 169th Infantry concentrated on the sector between FOX OP and SACOBIA RIDGE. The 1st and 3d Battalions 149th Infantry made limited advances encountering heavy resistance in the extremely rugged terrain at the base of SAW TOOTH and SPENCE RIDGES. The 3d Battalion 169th Infantry patrolled and destroyed caves to the rear along the CAUAYAN River upon being relieved.

Company E 152d Infantry relieved the 38th Reconnaissance Troop in the MORIONES River area on 19 March, placing one platoon at TIAONG, one platoon at O'DONNELL, and one platoon at MORIONES. The remainder of the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry, against moderate resistance, pushed deep into the river draws 2000 - 3000 yards Southeast of HIGH PEAK. The 38th Reconnaissance Troop moved to CONCEPTION 5 miles E of BAMBAN and was given the mission to investigate reports of enemy stragglers along Highway 7.

The 1st Battalion 169th Infantry was ordered to move Southeast along the SACOBIA River with its objective the JAP MOTOR POOL, at that time under constant surveillance by their Anti-tank Company. An enveloping move by this Battalion gained part of the palteaus South of the JAP MOTOR POOL; but, handicapped by the terrain in this area, repeated attempts to penetrate into the MOTOR POOL were unsuccessful. On 18 March Company B 82d Chemical Battalion fired 1325 rounds (18% white phosphorous) in support of this action. At 191200 March it was detached from the 38th Division, reverting to Battalion control in place.

On 20 March orders were received from XI Corps to relieve

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the 169th Regimental Combat Team and to concentrate their units by 222400 March for movement.

Both Regiments had a definite mission on 21 March. The 1st Battalion 149th Infantry after an artillery and mortar preparation attacked South with its objective to secure SPENCE RIDGE in that sector. Companies A and B, as leading elements, advanced approximately 500 yards against increasingly heavier resistance. Gains were made only after a hard coordinated attack on each successive hill or ridge.

The 2d Battalion 149th Infantry patrolled forward from vicinity FOX OP and cleaned out the adjacent river draws. Enemy contact developed late in the period at the East end of SPENCE RIDGE. In addition to artillery and mortar fire the Battalion Headquarters Company fired a .50 Cal preparation from FOX OP that was very effective. Company G gained a high point on the East nose of this ridge and held it under harassing grenade and mortar fire from the enemy. Enemy emplacements were definitely located and supplies were brought forward in preparation to attack these positions on the following day.

Company I led the assault of the 3d Battalion 149th Infantry during this day. After a preparation of 100 rounds 155mm Artillery and 150 rounds 105mm cannon from the Cannon Company, Company I made repeated attempts to capture SAWTOOTH Ridge. On each successive terrain feature the enemy occupied well dug in emplacements, well camouflaged and so arranged as to afford interlocking fires. 60mm and 81mm mortars were fired to blanket certain strong points while others, one by one, were being neutralized. Results of the days attack showed a gain of approximately 800 yards.

During the period 600 rounds of 60mm mortar, 200 rounds of 81mm mortar and 1730 rounds of artillery (105mm and 155mm) were fired by the Task Force, a major portion of it in support of the 149th Infantry.

The operation of the 169th Infantry on 21 March was as follows: The 1st Battalion, with Company A leading, again tried to move around the flank of the JAP MOTOR POOL positions. At the close of the day they were about 1200 yards from the objective. Two factors handicapped the progress of this Battalion; first, it was understrength, Company A could muster approximately 40 riflemen; and second, the extremely difficult and rugged terrain.

Near SACOBIA RIDGE the 2d Battalion 169th Infantry held positions on the East end of the ridge, a small nose on the North side, and the draw North of SACOBIA RIDGE. The days

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57mm AT gun firing across 2d Battalion 149th Infantry flank on SACOBIA Ridge (skyline on left). Direct fire destroyed 7 enemy machine guns and 3 20mm dual purpose AA guns located along ridge to the right of the hump in the skyline.

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principle activity for this Battalion consisted mainly of "flushing out" the draws and destroying caves in that vicinity.

The 3d Battalion 169th Infantry, on the previously assigned mission to move Southwest on the JAP MOTOR POOL, advanced about 2000 yards against light opposition. By the end of the period they had cleaned out the draws along SACOBIA River and about 300 yards on the North fork between LEWIS and SACOBIA RIDGES.

In preparation for the forthcoming relief of the 169th Regimental Combat Team the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry moved by truck to the East entrance of the JAP MOTOR POOL. The move was completed late in the afternoon and the Battalion prepared for attack the following day.

Early in the morning of this day a report from the 632d Tank Destroyer Battalion (I Corps troops) of several Japanese in the vicinity of TARLAC was received. Upon investigation by elements of 38th Reconnaissance Troop an estimated force of 40 entrenched enemy was engaged North of TARLAC River and 2000-3000 yards West of TARLAC. The Japanese position was a clump of bamboo and trees North of a deep swampy creek. Their machine guns controlled the road and the rice paddies on both sides of the stream; while the bridge was too weak to carry the M-8 Armored Cars. Men could advance to the edge of the stream by crawling along the paddy dikes, but could not cross the waist deep mud in the stream. A guerrilla party attempting this was driven back with some losses.

When it became apparent that dismounted men could not cross the creek, fire from 60mm mortars and the 37mm's on the Armored Cars was placed on the thicket. At the same time several cars made a circuit of four miles, crossed the creek at another bridge, and came in from the rear. On signal fire was lifted, and the men came in from the rear. After a short encounter, twenty-seven whole dead Japanese were counted, and an estimated thirteen in pieces.

Several elements were engaged in this action of TARLAC which occupied most of the day. In addition to the 38th Reconnaissance Troop, an Artillery Liaison plane played an interesting part. The Artillery Air Officer and the Task Force S-4, investigating the situation from the air, dropped a quantity of fragmentation and white phosphorous hand grenades on the entrenched enemy. Results were negligible and some small arms fire was received but with no damage to the plane or occupants.

At 212000 March 1945 the 169th Regimental Combat Team was issued orders to concentrate in the vicinity of FT STOTSENBURG

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not later than 222400 March. They were to be prepared to move on XI Corps order.

The results of 13 days (10-22 March) of combat duty with the 38th Division Advance (Task Force) netted the 169th Regimental Combat Team approximately 800 enemy killed, or found dead from artillery and mortar fire. Their casualties for this period were 40 KIA and 177 WIA, a ratio of approximately 4 Japanese killed to every friendly casualty.

The 1st and 2d Battalions 169th Infantry and the 169th Field Artillery Battalion continued their mission until 1200, 22 March. Company A pressing Northward on the JAP MOTOR POOL encountered an enemy strongpoint approximately 600 yards from the objective. Company B entered the JAP MOTOR POOL from the Southeast and, with the assistance of Cannon Company self propelled mounts, operated in that area until noon destroying numerous caves and enemy positions. Companies I, K and L maneuvered on the South fork of SACOBIA River neutralizing several strong points that held up their previous days advances. During this one-half day 15 Japanese were killed and 4 found dead from artillery and mortar fire. The 169th Regimental Combat Team then assembled vicinity FT STOTSENBURG as ordered. Continuance of the mission against the JAP MOTOR POOL was taken over by the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry (less Company E) who were already in position and advancing through the East entrance.

The remaining assault elements of the 38th Division Advance (Task Force) on 22 March continued an aggressive attack. With the 1st Battalion 149th Infantry gains were measured in hard fought yards. Companies A and B lead the attack, Company A forward and Company B enveloping on the Battalion right (West) flank gaining approximately 500 yards. Extremely difficult terrain, more often with only one approach to the target, was the greatest handicap. Enemy resistance consisted of heavy sniper, automatic weapons and knee mortar fire. Caves some of them 30 to 40 feet deep were destroyed by the combined effort of assault infantrymen and heavy artillery and mortar concentrations.

On the East end of SPENCE Ridge the 2d Battalion 149th Infantry concentrated maximum effort to gain a firmer foothold. Company G from a vantage point on the Northeast nose attacked frontally, Company F flanked the same position from the East, both were supported by heavy 155mm and 105mm artillery and 81mm mortar preparations. A Japanese 37mm Antitank gun less sight was dismantled and hand carried to the top of FOX OP where the 1st Sergeant of the Battalion Headquarters Company bore sighted and fired direct into enemy emplacements confronting Companies F and G. Lt Col Silas B. Dishman, the Battalion Commander, was the observer and Lt Col Carl O. DeBard, Commanding Officer of the 139th Field Artillery Battalion, was the assistant gunner.

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The objective of Company G was a large enemy strong point on a steep sided hill just below the Eastern end of SPENCE Ridge. Several attacks were made on this hill during the morning. From the development of the enemies positions, Company G rearranged its plan of maneuver. Late in the afternoon after a mortar and artillery preparation, a bayonet charge was made up the hill. Seventy-three Japanese were killed with bayonets and grenades, and the hill secured. Over 30 caves were closed, the majority of which were known to contain from 1 to 3 Japanese. This objective was overlooked by a higher fortified knoll to the rear afterward known as DISHMAN Hill. Company E occupied positions on the North slopes of SACOBIA Ridge.

The 3d Battalion again on this same day pressed onward to the objective, SAWTOOTH Ridge. Company I, again leading, attacked along a steep "hogback" extending North from the ridge. Only one approach was available to this Company and it was well fortified and continually swept by enemy automatic weapons fire from the adjacent ridges. By the end of the period Company I, assisted by a left (East) flank attempted by Company L, was firmly entrenched on high ground commanding all but the South side of SAWTOOTH Ridge. Company K advanced to occupy an adjoining high point to the West.

On 22 March approximately 700 rounds and 29 concentrations were fired by the Artillery and over 1200 rounds of 81mm and 800 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition were fired in close support of the Task Force. Wire communications were uninterrupted. The Engineers concentrated their maximum effort to the forward elements. Even the Engineer's excellent support left the leading elements with a supply problem of hand carrying food, water and ammunition 2000 to 3000 yards over very rough trails.

During the night of 22-23 March the enemy harassed all Battalions of the 149th Infantry with grenades and mortars. All elements held their hard won positions. This produced no friendly casualties, however, and did not hinder preparations to continue the attack on the following day.

Early in the morning of 23 March the Task Force Artillery and 81mm mortars fired preparations for the 1st, 2d and 3d Battalions of the 149th Infantry. The 1st Battalion attacked at 0930, the 2d Battalion at 0905 and the 3d Battalion at 0900.

The 2d Battalion 152d Infantry (less Company E), supported by one self propelled mount, began to feel out the likely approaches into enemy positions in the JAP MOTOR POOL area. Company E 152d Infantry during the day was relieved of its mission in the TIAONG - O'DONNELL - MORIONES area by a Provisional Company composed of one Provisional Platoon from each of the

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138th, 139th and 150th Field Artillery Battalions. Company E rejoined the Battalion at noon on 24 March.

The 1st Battalion 149th Infantry under a rolling mortar barrage gained very little distance but eliminated an enemy strongpoint which was the outpost of a highly organized fortified area estimated to contain 300 to 400 enemy.

Captured enemy weapons silenced several Japanese automatic weapons for the 2d Battalion. Several caves and emplacements were sealed while the Battalion reorganized and resupplied for the next attack.

For the 3d Battalion 149th Infantry the situation was much the same as the 1st Battalion. Local assaults captured two enemy strongpoints on SAWTOOTH Ridge, entrenchments embedded in rock and eliminated only by the assistance of heavy 81mm mortar concentrations. Several Japanese weapons including machine guns and knee mortars were captured and then used successfully against the enemy.

Gains in the 149th Infantry sector were not noted in ground distance this day. The amount of supporting 60mm and 81mm mortar ammunition expended will indicate the type of work done and the quality of the enemy's resistance. 4250 rounds of 60mm and 3371 rounds of 81mm were fired. This was more than three times as much as was fired on the previous day.

There is, however, an explanation as to why the ammunition expenditure was so much greater. Brig Gen William Spence, Task Force Commanding General, and Brig Gen Robert H. Soule (then Colonel), the Assistant Division Commander, saw how effective massed mortar fires were in this type terrain. Knowing that this was the major activity of the 38th Division at this time they requested two extra 81mm Mortar Platoons. The request was granted and a Platoon from the 151st Infantry and one from the 152d Infantry were dispatched. The one from the 151st Infantry arrived on 23 March in time to participate in the action of the 149th Infantry. As the Platoon from the 152d Infantry had to be moved from the vicinity of SAN MARCELINO Airfield, it did not arrive until late in the period. This Platoon was attached to the 2d Battalion 152d Infantry upon arrival.

The 113th Engineer (C) Battalion was greatly responsible for the advance of assault infantrymen during the past days, although the terrain by now had become so difficult that it was almost impossible to further extend the existing supply roads. The situation was overcome to some extent by constructing laterals or by building an entirely new road where the terrain would permit.

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